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Authentication verifies users’ identities to protect against costly attacks. Graphical 
authentication schemes utilize pictures as passcodes rather than strings of characters. Pictures 
have been found to be more memorable than the strings of characters used in alphanumeric 
passwords. However, graphical passcodes have been criticized for being susceptible to Over-the-
Shoulder Attacks (OSA). To overcome this concern, many graphical schemes have been 
designed to be resistant to OSA.  Security to this type of attack is accomplished by grouping 
targets among distractors, translating the selection of targets elsewhere, disguising targets, and 
using gaze-based input. 
Prototypical examples of graphical schemes that use these strategies to bolster security 
against OSAs were directly compared in within-subjects runoffs in studies 1 and 2. The first aim 
of this research was to discover the current usability limitations of graphical schemes. The data 
suggested that error rates are a common issue among graphical passcodes attempting to resist 
OSAs. Studies 3 and 4 investigated the memorability of graphical passcodes when users need to 
remember multiple passcodes or longer passcodes. Longer passcodes provide advantages to 
security by protecting against brute force attacks, and multiple passcodes need to be investigated 
as users need to authenticate for numerous accounts. It was found that participants have strong 
item retention for passcodes of up to eight images and for up to eight accounts. Also these 
  
studies leveraged context to facilitate memorability. Context slightly improved the memorability 
of graphical passcodes when participants needed to remember credentials for eight accounts. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
The frequency and cost of cybersecurity attacks, such as worm attacks, is increasing 
(Walters, 2014). The average cost of a breach in data has more than doubled since 2010 
(Walters, 2014), with the cost reaching an average of $4 million per breach in 2016 (per a survey 
of 383 companies across 12 countries; IBM, 2016). For most attacks, a vulnerability in 
authentication must be exploited (Zviran & Haga, 1999). Authentication protects valuable or 
confidential information (e.g., company files, banking information, and health records) by 
requiring users to confirm their identity. A user is granted access to a network or system if they 
can confirm something they know (e.g., a password), something they have (e.g., a token), or 
something they are (e.g., a fingerprint; Cazier & Medlin, 2006). 
Alphanumeric passwords, a knowledge-based scheme, are the most commonly used 
authentication scheme (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011; Zviran & Haga, 1999). Alphanumeric 
passwords have widespread use because they are effective, efficient, subjectively satisfactory, 
and learnable. These passwords offer security against attacks, such as guessing attacks or worm 
attacks, when they have a large dimensional space (Zviran & Haga, 1999). They should be long 
and complex (Barton & Barton, 1984; Choong & Greene, 2016). They should not contain 
common words, and they should contain numbers and symbols (Barton & Barton, 1984; Choong 
& Greene, 2016). To be secure, alphanumeric passwords, should not be written down, they 
should be different for every account, and they should be changed often (Barton & Barton, 
1984). Users have difficulty applying the given rules for creating strong passwords, especially as 
guidance varies from system to system (Choong & Greene, 2016). In a recent study, Choong and 
Greene (2016) asked participants to classify passwords as to whether or not they comply with a 
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given set of rules. Although “special characters,” “symbols,” and “non-alphanumeric characters” 
have the same meaning, participants interpreted rules differently depending on how the rules 
were explained. Even when users apply password rules, stronger security can lead to trade-offs 
with usability. End users deal with limitations of usability by using “workarounds” and not using 
the system as it was intended to be used (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011). Long, complex strings 
of characters, symbols, and numbers are hard to remember (Zviran & Haga, 1999). Memorability 
is further hindered by the considerable number of passwords users have and by the need to 
routinely change passwords (Still, Cain, & Schuster, 2017). The security of alphanumeric 
passcodes is often undermined by users when they write them down or share passwords with 
loved-ones to solve problems with memorability (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011; Kaye, 2011; 
Paans & Herschberg, 1987). When forced to use unfamiliar alphanumeric passwords to bolster 
security, users are 18 times more likely to write them down (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011). A 
third of users report sharing their email password with someone else (Kaye, 2011). Users also 
undermine security to aid memorability by reusing passwords (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011). 
Up to 50% of alphanumeric passwords are reused (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011), and they are 
typically reused for 1.7 to 3.4 websites (Wash, Rader, Berman, & Wellmer, 2016). Although 
usability and security compete when selecting alphanumeric passcodes, alternate approaches to 
authentication may be able to provide both usability and security. 
Biometric authentication is becoming increasingly prevalent, and the marketplace is 
highly dependent on this type of authentication. With biometric authentication, users can 
authenticate using their personal characteristics, such as a fingerprint or face. The researchers do 
not believe biometric authentication is an all-encompassing solution because of its limitations. 
Firstly, the data from the biometric is stored in a database. When the database is eventually 
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hacked, the passcode can never be changed and the user’s identity is compromised for life (Jain 
& Nandakumar, 2012). Secondly, biometrics hold information about a user’s health, which 
should be private and not shared with companies that are requiring authentication (Jain & 
Nandakumar, 2012). Lastly, biometrics are not secrets. Therefore, attackers always have the 
options of forcing a user to authenticate. In fact, police are using the strategy of forcing users to 
unlock their phones to find incriminating evidence (Waddel, 2017). The researchers focus on 
other solutions because of the shortcomings inherent in biometric authentication. Security 
requirements, such as whether it is desirable to have two-factor authentication, can guide which 
type of authentication to use. 
Graphical authentication schemes are knowledge-based approaches that utilize pictures as 
passcodes rather than complex strings of characters. Graphical passcodes offer a solution to the 
problem of memorability that accompanies the alphanumeric scheme (Biddle, Chiasson, & Van 
Oorschot, 2012) and are not accompanied by the issues of privacy and security that accompany 
biometric authentication. The pictures used in graphical passcodes are more easily remembered 
than the strings of characters used in alphanumeric passwords because pictures allow for a 
greater depth of cognitive processing. The picture superiority effect explains that pictures are 
dual encoded both visually and semantically, whereas alphanumeric passcodes are only encoded 
semantically (Paivio, 1979). Further, pictures typically have more features than individual letters 
and numbers, thereby also facilitating retrieval.  
Although a graphical passcode is generally more memorable than an alphanumeric 
password, there may be limits to the memorability of graphical passcodes when users have many 
passcodes to remember or longer passcodes to remember. These are important topics to 
investigate as users have many accounts that require authentication and because longer passcodes 
4 
 
can improve security against brute force attacks. Also, although graphical schemes offer 
advantages for memory, they must also meet other usability needs to be considered as an 
alternative to the alphanumeric scheme. First, authentication systems must allow for quick access 
(Still et al., 2017) comparable to log in times for alphanumeric passwords (e.g., approximately 5 
seconds; Wiedenbeck, Waters, Birget, Brodskiy, & Memon, 2005). Authentication is a 
secondary task that serves as a gateway to the primary goal, so authentication processes need to 
be quick. Login times for elaborate graphical schemes may not meet the need for quick access 
(Sreelatha, Shashi, Anirudh, Ahamer, & Kumar, 2011) because it may take users longer to search 
for or recognize images. Second, to be usable, appropriate actions should be apparent to a wide 
range of users so that logins are successful with little training (Still et al., 2017). Confusion when 
authenticating will frustrate users when they are blocked from their primary goal. High error 
rates or poor learnability over time may reflect a lack of transparency for the actions needed to 
authenticate. The same issues could arise due to a lack of accessibility (Behl, Bhat, Ubhaykar, 
Godbole, & Kulkarni, 2014). Measurements of login times, error rates, and learnability can be 
used to index the usability of novel graphical schemes, and subjective satisfaction can reflect 
users’ reactions to these objective dimensions. 
Graphical schemes need to meet requirements of security as well as usability. The most 
cited vectors for attacks against graphical schemes are intersection attacks and over-the-shoulder 
attacks (OSA). Intersection attacks happen when attackers go through authentication challenges, 
count the number of times that an image appears, and then attempt to log in using the most 
frequently used images. The more challenges there are in a login, the greater the risk of an 
intersection attack. To defend against intersection attacks, there should be the same distractor 
images at each login (English & Poet, 2012). Each target should be paired with a small set of the 
5 
 
same distractors each time. In this way, the distractors will be seen as frequently as the targets. 
As a further countermeasure, if a distractor is selected, the scheme should show only dummy 
screens that include only distractors (English & Poet, 2012). Another good countermeasure is to 
lock out attackers after a certain number of failed attempts (English & Poet, 2012). This strategy 
prevents them from trying different passwords that they think might be likely.  
Another prominent susceptibility has been Over-the-Shoulder Attacks (OSA). OSAs 
occur when a casual observer steals a passcode in a public place. Images associated with some 
graphical passcodes can be clearly observed on the screen. Just as users can quickly recognize 
and remember pictures in their passcodes, attackers may be able to casually peek at and 
reproduce the pictures. Casual attackers are characterized by having minimal resources, minimal 
knowledge, and as being opportunistic. OSAs frequently happen in public places, such as on 
public transportation (Eiband, Khamis, von Zezschwitz, Hussmann, & Alt, 2017). These 
invasions of privacy are not always malicious, but they can be, and they bring up negative 
feelings (Eiband et al., 2017). Vulnerability increases if an attacker has the opportunity to view a 
login more than once. Concern over OSA vulnerability has delayed broader deployment of these 
schemes. To overcome this concern, many graphical schemes have been designed to resist OSAs 
by allowing for non-direct selection of targets, by obscuring the appearance of the targets, or by 
obscuring target selection (Hayashi et al., 2008; Khot et al., 2012; Wiedenbeck et al., 2006). I 
have identified in the literature four strategies that defend against OSAs. 1. Grouping targets 
among distractors (Manjunath, Satheesh, Saranyadevi, & Nithya, 2014; Wiedenbeck et al., 
2006). Users can select a group of images rather than directly selecting targets. 2. Translating 
targets to another location (De Luca, Hertzschuch, & Hussmann, 2010; Khot et al., 2012). 
Passcodes are also obscured when users translate targets to another location rather than directly 
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clicking them. 3. Disguising targets (Cain & Still, 2016; Hayashi et al., 2008). Disguising targets, 
such as by degrading images, can interfere with an attacker’s recognition of the passcodes. 4. 
Using gaze-based input (De Luca, Denzel, & Hussmann, 2009). Gaze-based input allows users to 
select targets using their eyes, which is difficult for an attacker to observe. These defenses keep 
out opportunistic attackers similarly to how a lock on a door functions. A locked door deters 
intruders who are casually looking for entry but does not keep out determined intruders. 
Similarly, OSA resistant graphical schemes deter casual attackers but do not protect against 
sophisticated attackers. I determined these classifications through a comprehensive literature 
search. I found articles using keywords such as graphical password, authentication, and over-the-
shoulder attack. Many of the articles came from HCI journals and CHI. An excel spreadsheet 
was built to organize the schemes by their security strategy, and categories of defense strategies 
were identified by commonalities listed in the excel sheet. Lastly, I selected prototypical 
examples from each class of schemes that best represented the strategies. The prototypical 
examples were commonly cited in the literature and had been well evaluated in usability studies 
by their creators. 
Prototypical Approaches 
Grouping. Previous schemes have avoided the direct selection of targets and the 
observability that comes with it by allowing users to select a group of distractors with a target. 
When the user selects the group, it is unclear to an attacker which image is the target and which 
are the distractors. The S3PA scheme (Vachaspati, Chakravarthy, & Avadhani, 2013) presents 
symbols on an 8x8 grid. Passcodes consist of three symbols. Users authenticate by clicking 
inside of the triangular region formed by their targets. Schemes with the same premise were 
described by Rajavat, Gala, and Redekar (2015) and Zhao and Li (2007). Joshuva, Rani, and 
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John’s (2011) scheme present a background image, and points on the image compose a passcode. 
Users authenticate by clicking inside the region created by the target points. Manjunath and 
colleagues’ (2014) scheme presents a color wheel with symbols in each segment of the wheel. 
Passcodes consist of a color and a symbol. Users authenticate by turning the wheel so that their 
symbol lines up with their color. Qian, Song, Huang, and Lai’s (2013) scheme displays one large 
image encircled by a disk of smaller images. Passcodes consist of a small image and a point on 
the large image. To authenticate, users turn the disk until the target small image lines up with a 
target point on the large image. No experiment was performed to assess the usability or security 
of S3PA, Rajavat and colleagues’ (2015) scheme, Zhao and Li’s (2007) scheme, Joshuva and 
colleagues’ (2011) scheme, Manjunath and colleagues’ (2014) scheme, or Qian and colleagues’ 
(2013) scheme. 
Sreelatha and colleagues’ (2011) scheme presents a grid of letters. Users’ passcodes 
consist of two letters on the grid. Users authenticate by selecting the letter that is at the 
intersection of their passcode letters, rather than clicking directly on their passcode. Behl and 
colleagues’ (2014) scheme similarly presents characters on a grid. Users’ passcodes consist of 
four characters. They authenticate by selecting the letter at the intersection of the four passcode 
characters. Sreelatha and colleagues (2011) reported login times of 29.95 seconds, and Behl and 
colleagues (2014) reported login times of five seconds for their schemes of finding the 
intersections of letters. Behl and colleagues (2014) found that participants successfully 
authenticated with their scheme at a rate of 80%. 
Convex Hull Click (CHC; Wiedenbeck et al., 2006) displays an interface of icons. Some 
icons compose a passcode. Users authenticated by selecting an icon within the shape formed by 
their targets. Depending on the security required, users could repeat this process once or multiple 
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times. CHC had login times of 71.66 seconds. Users successfully authenticated using CHC with 
success rates of 90.35%. CHC was found to be memorable. After a one-week delay, 14 out of 15 
participants remembered their pass icons. 
Translating to another location. Other schemes offer resistance by allowing users to 
transfer targets elsewhere rather than clicking directly on them. Similar to the grouping schemes, 
these schemes avoid the direct selection of targets. Van Oorschot and Wan’s (2009) scheme 
presents numbered images on a grid. Clickable numbers are also presented below the grid. Users 
authenticate by selecting the numbers below the grid associated with their target images. Rokade, 
Hasan, and Mahajan’s (2014) scheme displays a grid of images. Each image has a letter 
associated with it (e.g., “a” for apple). Passcodes consist of four images. Users authenticate by 
typing the four letters corresponding to their images. No experiment was performed to assess 
Van Oorschot and Wan’s (2009) scheme or Rokade and colleagues’ (2014) scheme. 
GrIDsure (Brostoff, Inglesant, & Sasse, 2010) presents a 5x5 grid of images. There are 
four target images. Each image has a one-time, random number. Users authenticate by typing the 
numbers associated with their target images. Zangooei, Mansoori, and Welch’s (2012) scheme 
presents a grid of images. The grid is then replaced by a grid of one-time, random numbers and 
letters. Users authenticate by typing the numbers that were in the locations where their images 
had been. ColorPIN (De Luca et al., 2010) presents a grid of numbers with three letters below 
each. The numbers are in black, white, and red. The passcodes consist of a number and a color. 
Users authenticate by typing the number that was the target color for a target number. Login 
times were 8 seconds for Zangooei and colleagues’ (2012) scheme and 13.88 seconds for 
ColorPIN (De Luca et al., 2010). All participants could log in at least once in three attempts 
using ColorPin. Ninety-one percent of authentication attempts were successful for GrIDsure after 
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three to four days, 97% after nine to ten days, and 27% after one year (Brostoff et al., 2010). 
Memorability was demonstrated for Zangooei and colleagues’ scheme. Twenty-seven out of 30 
participants remembered their passcode after a one-week delay. OSAs were explored for 
Zangooei and colleagues’ scheme and ColorPin. A simulated attacker would be able to steal the 
passcode 4% of the time for ColorPin. When participants took on the role of attacker, none could 
identify the full passcode for Zangooei and colleagues’ scheme. 
SSSL (Perkovic, Cagalj, & Rakic, 2009) presents numbers on a 5x5 grid. Users 
authenticate by using arrows on the side of the grid to select their targets. Pressure-faces (Kim, 
Dunphy, Briggs, Hook, Nicholson, Nicholson, & Olivier, 2010) displays a 3x3 grid of faces on a 
tabletop, touch-sensitive interface. Each face had a pressure level associated with it, and the 
passcode consists of target faces and their pressures. On the interface, pressure sensitive bars 
extend from the grid. Users place their fingers on bars extending from the grid of faces to 
authenticate. Login times were eight seconds for SSSL and 11 seconds for Pressure-faces.  
Success rates for SSSL were 93%. Subjectively, 11 out of 15 participants reported that SSSL was 
easy to learn and use. As attackers, no participant could identify the full passcode for Pressure-
faces. 
CBFG (Liu, Qiu, Ma, Gao, & Ren, 2011b) displays a background image. The image is 
broken into numbered cells. Passcodes consist of points on the image. Users authenticate by 
selecting numbers on the side of the image corresponding to the cells of their target locations. 
PassMatrix (Sun, Chen, Yeh, & Cheng, 2016) also displays a background image divided into 
cells, and passcodes are points on the image. Users authenticate by using a scroll bar on the side 
to select cells containing their target image locations. Login times were 21.4 seconds for CBFG 
and 31.11 seconds for PassMatrix. Success rates were 92.3% for CBFG. Success rates were 
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86.67% for PassMatrix on day one and were 66.67% after two weeks. When participants took on 
the role of attacker, none could identify the full passcode for CBFG or PassMatrix. 
Passblot (Gupta, Sahni, Sabbu, Varma, & Gangashetty, 2012) displays images of 
inkblots. Users authenticate by typing words they associate with the inkblots. What You See is 
What You Enter (WYSWYE; Khot et al., 2012) displays a 5x5 grid of images on the left side of 
the interface. On the right side is a blank, 4x4 grid. A passcode consists of four images. On the 
5x5 grid, there is one row and one column that does not contain a target image. To authenticate, 
users mentally delete the row and column with no target, mentally shift the remaining cells 
together, and click the location on the blank grid. Login times were 23.74 seconds for Passblot 
and 35.5 seconds for WYSWYE. All participants could log in at least once in three attempts 
using WYSWYE. Success rates were 98.5% for Passblots on day one and 84.6% one week later. 
For WYSWYE, dimensions of satisfaction (e.g., preference and ease of use) were rated between 
64 and 84%.  
Disguising. Graphical schemes have been made resistant by disguising targets to interfere 
with attackers’ recognition processes. R-Das (Chakrabarti, Landon, & Singhal, 2007) integrates 
rotation as a method for disguising Draw a Secret (DAS; Jermyn, Mayer, Monrose, Reiter, & 
Rubin, 1999). Using DAS, users draw a freehand doodle to authenticate. The rotation of R-Das 
introduces another dimension that an attacker must also detect. YAGP (Liu et al., 2011a) created 
a version of DAS that can be drawn smaller and anywhere on the screen to help hide the 
passcode. Zakaria, Griffiths, Brostoff, and Yan (2011) disguised DAS using decoy strokes, 
disappearing strokes, and a line snaking. Decoy strokes are additional lines drawn by the system. 
Disappearing strokes hide the passcode as soon as it is completely drawn. Line snaking hides the 
passcode while it is being drawn. Login times were 3.4 seconds for YAGP. Success rates were 
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76% for YGAP. Thirty-eight out of 42 participants could remember their passcode one week 
later. When participants took on the role of attacker, YGAP passcodes were stolen in 7% of 
attempts. For Zakaria and colleagues’ decoy strokes, 77% of strokes were stolen, for 
disappearing strokes 40% were stolen, and for line snaking 50% were stolen. 
Facelock (Jenkins, McLachlan, & Renaud, 2014) presents faces on a 3x3 grid similarly to 
Passface (RealUser, 2005). Users select target faces to authenticate. Different photographs of the 
same individuals are used at each login to confuse attackers. Incognito (Still & Bell, 2018) 
presents a 3x3 grid of numbers. As users log in to this PIN interface, the button that is being 
selected is highlighted. However, decoy buttons are also highlighted. Input from the mouse 
cursor or the gaze-guided mouse cursor is made invisible. Sasamoto and colleagues’ (2008) 
scheme presents pictures that are distorted by removing detail but retaining general colors and 
shapes. Users could authenticate by using a tactile, rotating ball to select their targets. RSVP 
(Cain & Still, 2016) presents degraded images in rapid succession temporally rather than 
statically. Line drawings are degraded by removing lines for curvature and intersection to 
interfere with attackers’ object recognition. Users authenticate by hitting the space bar or tapping 
the screen when they see their targets. Use Your Illusion (UYI; Hayashi et al., 2008) presents 
three subsequent, 3x3 grids of degraded images. Detail is removed, but color and shape are 
maintained. Passcodes are three images with one on each grid. Users authenticate by directly 
selecting their targets. Login times were over a minute for Sasamoto and colleagues’ scheme, 
and login times were between 11.5 and 24.7 seconds for UYI. Participants needed an average of 
1.42 attempts to log in using Incognito when using the mouse and 1.65 attempts when using eye-
gaze. Most participants made one error or no errors for Sasamoto and colleagues’ scheme. All 
participants correctly logged in at least once in three attempts using RSVP and UYI. When 
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testing for UYI memorability, success rates dropped to 89% three weeks later. As attackers, 
1.9% of attackers stole Facelock passcodes. Sasamoto and colleagues’ scheme was resistant to 
OSA so long as the hand completely covered the rotating ball. No attacker identified the whole 
passcode for Incognito or RSVP.  
Gaze-based input. OSAs can be protected against by having users authenticate using 
their eyes. Eye gaze is harder for an attacker to observe than mouse and touch input. Dunphy, 
Fitch, and Olivier’s (2008) scheme allow users to select faces similarly to Passface (RealUser, 
2005) using gaze input. Bulling and colleagues’ (2012) scheme presents a background image. 
Users authenticate by looking at target locations on the image. EYE-Pass Shapes (De Luca et al., 
2009) presents a 4x3 grid of dots. Users authenticate by making a pattern on the grid using their 
eyes. 
 Login times were 24.9 seconds for Dunphy and colleagues’ (2008) scheme and were 5.8 
seconds for EYE-Pass Shapes (De Luca et al., 2009). Participants often logged in on their first 
attempts using Dunphy and colleagues’ scheme. Using EYE-Pass Shapes, all participants logged 
in at least once in three attempts. Three days later, participants made very few requests to remind 
them what their target faces were. 71% of participants could remember their pattern for EYE-
Pass Shapes after a ten-day delay. When participants took on the role of attacker, they needed 
two or three attempts to identify passcodes for EYE-Pass Shapes. Subjectively, participants 
reported that Bulling and colleagues’ (2012) scheme and EYE-Pass Shapes were not as easy to 
use as traditional PIN passcodes.  
Needs Addressed by the Current Studies 
Previous literature has offered many schemes for graphical authentication that are 
designed to be OSA resistant. Many schemes have been experimentally tested to determine their 
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usability and security (Hayashi et al., 2008; Khot et al., 2012; Wiedenbeck et al., 2006). Schemes 
have also been compared with traditional PIN authentication (Bulling et al., 2012; De Luca et al., 
2009). Because different methods were used by different experimenters to assess each scheme, 
comparisons among schemes are difficult. For example, different amounts of training are given 
before experimental trials, and there are different lengths of delays before measuring 
memorability. OSA measures may allow for one or multiple viewings of the passcode, they may 
allow for one or multiple attempts to identify a passcode, and they may be motivated by reward 
or not. Satisfaction was measured by a variety of methods.  
Limited previous studies have directly compared graphical schemes. Schaub, Walch, 
Könings, and Weber (2013) compared five graphical schemes that allow for authentication on 
small touchscreen devices using strategies of recall and cued-recall. The schemes were also 
compared with the PIN scheme. UYI was the only scheme included in Schaub and colleagues’ 
analysis that was designed to be resistant to OSA. They found that the graphical schemes had 
similar usability to the PIN scheme, and they were more resistant to OSA on small touch screens 
than the PIN scheme. 
Johnson and Werner (2008) compared the memorability of four graphical passcodes and 
an alphanumeric password after 30 minutes and one week. The prototypes of graphical schemes 
the researchers included combined an image with a background, had grids of faces, had grids of 
images, and had one large image with click points. All of the graphical schemes were more 
memorable than the alphanumeric scheme. 
The current studies provide a direct comparison of prototypical OSA resistant passcodes 
and an alphanumeric passcode. CHC (Wiedenbeck et al., 2006) represented graphical passcodes 
that are made resistant to OSA by allowing users to authenticate without clicking directly on the 
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targets. WYSWYE (Khot et al., 2012) represented graphical passcodes that are made resistant to 
OSA by translating targets to another location. UYI (Hayashi et al.) represented a group of 
graphical passcodes that disguise targets. Eye-Pass Shapes (De Luca et al., 2009) represented 
passcodes that are entered using gaze to obstruct OSA.  
To advance the study and eventual use of graphical schemes, it is important to consider 
how the OSA-resistant schemes compare to traditional passcodes (i.e., De Luca et al., 2010; 
Sasamoto, Christin, & Hayashi, 2008) and how they compare to each other (i.e., Bulling, Alt, & 
Schmidt, 2012; Cain & Still, 2016; De Luca et al., 2009; Liu, Gao, Wang, & Chang, 2011). 
Studies 1 and 2 directly compared the usability and security of prototypical OSA-resistant 
graphical schemes (grouping, translating to another location, disguising, and gaze-based input), a 
gaze-based scheme, and an alphanumeric scheme in a within-subjects design. Their effectiveness 
regarding usability - error rates, login times, learnability, memorability, acceptance, and 
satisfaction - and security - OSA resistance were explored. Findings showed how graphical 
schemes that use different strategies for security compare with each other and with the traditional 
alphanumeric scheme on usability requirements of memorability, quick access, accessibility, 







CHAPTER 2: STUDY 1: USABILITY AND SECURITY RUNOFF 
Method 
Participants. Twenty undergraduate students participated (females = 11). They were 
recruited through the SONA system and compensated with class research credit. One participant 
reported being left hand dominant. Ages ranged from 18 to 53 (M = 23.05, SD = 8.60). Reported 
computer use ranged from 3 to 15 hours a day (M = 7.2, SD = 3.28). All participants reported 
normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Stimuli and Apparatus. Five prototypes of authentication schemes were created for this 
study. Four graphical schemes were based on Eye-Pass Shapes (a gaze-based scheme; De Luca 
et al., 2009), Convex-Hull Click (CHC; Wiedenbeck et al., 2006), Use Your Illusion (UYI; 
Hayashi et al., 2008), and What You See is Where You Enter (WYSWYE; Khot et al., 2012). 
These four schemes were compared to an alphanumeric scheme. CHC, UYI, WYSWYE, and 
alphanumeric prototypes were presented on a Windows desktop computer with a 24-inch 
monitor. Their presentation and data collection (selection locations and login times) was 
controlled using Paradigm©. The gaze-based scheme was presented on a Windows desktop 
computer with a 16-inch monitor. 
Gaze-based scheme 
The gaze-based prototype based on Eye-Pass Shapes consisted of a 3x4 dot configuration 
with an Enter button on the upper right (see figure 1). The grid was 513x379 pixels. Each dot 
had a radius of 50 pixels, and the selection area for each was a 120x120 pixel square. The 
interface was implemented using HTML. The internet browser was Firefox. An Eye Tribe © 
eye-tracker was used to control the mouse cursor. Java code made the mouse cursor invisible 
while over the grid of dots. Java code measured the time of every selection of the enter button 
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and determined if it was correct. The response time and feedback of correct or incorrect was 
presented below the grid of dots. Dragger© made a selection every .7 seconds at the locations of 
the invisible mouse cursor. A jitter box of 22 pixels controlled minor movements of the mouse 
cursor. The passcode consisted of four dots in sequential order. Every participant used this same 
system-assigned passcode. A researcher recorded the time of all attempts to log in. This 
graphical scheme represents a collection of implementations offered by a variety of research 
groups (Arianezhad, Stebila, & Mozaffari, 2013; Bulling, Alt, & Schmidt, 2012; Dunphy, Fitch, 
& Olivier, 2008; Forget, Chiasson, & Biddle, 2010; Hoanca & Mock, 2006; Kumar, Garfinkel, 




Figure 1. Prototype of a gaze-based graphical scheme 
 
 
CHC. CHC consisted of icons on a 10x15 grid (see figure 2). The icons came from an 
online, open source database (http://www.fatcow.com/free-icons). The grid was 4138x1126 
pixels. Each icon was 55x45 pixels. The passcode consisted of three system-assigned icons. 
Because there were three target icons, they would always form a triangle shape on the grid (see 
figure 3). Target icons were never located in a straight line. A correct login occurred when a 
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participant selected one time anywhere inside the triangular region created by the three icons. 
They were told not to click directly on target icons and not to hover the mouse cursor over their 
target icons. The researcher provided verbal feedback of correct or incorrect after each 
authentication attempt. After each attempt, the icons were repositioned. This graphical scheme 
that was created represents a collection of implementations (Ankush & Husain, 2014; Behl et al., 
2014; Chen, Ku, Yeh, Liao, 2013; Joshuva, Rani, & John, 2011; Kiran, Rao, & Rao, 2012; Li, 
Sreelatha et al., 2011; Sun, Lian, & Giusto, 2005; Manjunath et al., 2014; Rao & Yalamanchili, 




Figure 2. Prototype of CHC 
  
Figure 3. Three target icons form a region. 
 
 
UYI. UYI was presented as images in a 3x3 grid that were degraded by removing detail 
but retaining general colors and shapes (see figure 4). The grid was 774x571 pixels. Each image 
was 213x175 pixels. A passcode consisted of three system-assigned images. A correct login 
occurred when a participant selected the degraded versions of each of their three targets on three 
subsequent grids. The researcher provided verbal feedback of correct or incorrect after each 
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authentication attempt. After each attempt, the images were repositioned. This graphical scheme 
represents a collection of implementations offered by a variety of research groups (Cain & Still, 
2016; Gao, Guo, Chen, Wang, & Liu, 2008; Ghori & Abbasi, 2013; Hui, Bashier, Hoe, Kwee, & 
Sayeed, 2014; Jenkins, McLachlan, & Renaud, 2014; Lin, Dunphy, Olivier, & Yan, 2007; Liu et 
al., 2011; Meng & Li, 2013; Nicholson, 2009; Sasamoto et al., 2008; Yakovlev & Arkhipov, 




Figure 4. Prototype of UYI. Images are taken from Hayashi et al., 2008. 
 
 
WYSWYE. The interface for WYSWYE showed a 5x5 grid of images on the right side of 
the screen. The grid of images was 715x549 pixels. Each image was 139x103 pixels. A blank 
4x4 grid was on the left side (see figure 5). The blank grid was 578 by 459 pixels. The blank 
cells were 139x103 pixels. A passcode consisted of four system-assigned images. Participants 
had to perform mental operations before logging in. First, they had to mentally delete a row and 
column that did not contain a target on the 5x5 grid. Then, they would mentally shift the 
remaining cells together. They log in by clicking the locations of their four targets on the blank 
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grid. The researcher provided verbal feedback of correct or incorrect after each authentication 
attempt. The images were repositioned for every attempt. This graphical scheme that was created 
represents a collection of implementations (Bianchi, Oakley, & Kim, 2016; Brostoff, Inglesant, 
& Sasse, 2010; De Luca et al., 2010; Gao, Liu, Dai, Wang, & Chang, 2009; Gupta, Sahni, Sabbu, 
Varma, & Gangashetty, 2012; Kawagoe, Sakaguchi, Sakon, & Huang, 2012; Kim, Dunphy, 
Briggs, Hook, Nicholson, Nicholson, & Olivier, 2010; Lashkari, Manaf, & Masrom, 2011; 




Figure 5. Prototype of WYSWYE. Images are taken from Khot et al., 2012. 
 
 
Alphanumeric. The alphanumeric interface consisted of a box for text entry and an enter 
button. It was implemented with HTML and run in Firefox. Java code captured login times. It 
displayed them below the primary interface frame, and the researcher recorded them. The 
passcode used by all participants was “col2Wlan6.” This passcode met the rules for strong 
passwords including that it should not contain common words and it should contain numbers 
(Barton & Barton, 1984; Choong & Greene, 2016). The passcode was system-assigned because 
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this ensured that participants did not reuse passwords from their other accounts, did not create 
passwords that contained personal information, and did not use dictionary words, which would 
result in weak passwords (Cazier & Medlin, 2006; Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011, Zviran & 
Haga, 1999). Having the alphanumeric password being system-assigned also avoided giving it an 
unfair advantage over the graphical passwords, which were system-assigned and for which 
participants could not select images that were meaningful to them. Comparisons of the system-
assigned alphanumeric password with new password schemes have been exemplified in previous 
literature (Zviran & Haga, 1990). 
Procedure. Participants were run individually. They were seated in front of a desktop 
computer. The researcher explained that they would be authenticating using five different 
schemes, and participants signed a consent form after being allowed time to ask questions. The 
schemes were: gaze, CHC, UYI, WYSWYE, and alphanumeric. The order of the schemes was 
counterbalanced using a Latin Square design across participants. For each scheme, participants 
were given instructions, and they had one practice trial. After instructions, the experimenter 
would answer questions at any time. The experimenter would tell the participants whether they 
had correctly authenticated on every trial to provide them with feedback. Participants completed 
nine experimental trials of CHC, WYSWYE, and the alphanumeric scheme. Because three 
challenges are necessary to log in with UYI, participants logged in three times with UYI. 
Participants logged in four times with the gaze-based scheme. 
After each set of experimental trials, participants took on the role of a casual attacker 
performing an OSA for each of the graphical schemes and the gaze-based scheme. They viewed 
a video of the researcher logging in one time. The video only showed the screen, including 
mouse movements as it appeared while the researcher logged in. Then they circled the passcode 
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they thought they observed on an answer sheet. They viewed the same passcodes being entered 
two more times, and they made another attempt to identify the passcode on the answer sheet. 
Results 
Dependent variables were: error rates, learnability, and OSA performance. Bonferroni 
corrections were used for all post hoc comparisons.  
Error rates. Error rates were calculated as the number of incorrect trials of the total 
experimental trials for each scheme. A repeated measures ANOVA (authentication scheme: 
CHC, UYI, WYSWYE, gaze-based, and alphanumeric) was conducted to explore error rates. 
Sphericity was violated, so a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. Differences were 
found among error rates (see figure 6), F(2.49, 37.29) = 9.02, p < .001, partial η2 = .376. Post hoc 
comparisons revealed that CHC (M = .18, SD = .16) was entered with fewer errors than the gaze-
based scheme (M = .42, SD = .20), and alphanumeric passcodes (M = .01, SD = .04) were entered 
with fewer errors than passcodes for UYI (M = .34, SD = .40), WYSWYE (M = .28, SD = .23), 
and gaze-based, p < .05 for all comparisons. No error rate differences were found between gaze-
based scheme and UYI, p = 1.00, or WYSWYE, p = .55, and no differences were found between 
CHC and UYI, p = .32, WYSWYE, p = 1.00, or alphanumeric passcodes, p = .29. No differences 
were found between UYI and WYSWYE, p > .99. Participants made more errors using the UYI, 
WYSWYE, and the gaze-based schemes compared to the alphanumeric scheme. Of the graphical 




Figure 6. Error rates. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Login Times.  Login times were calculated for correct, experimental trials. Login times 
were cleaned for CHC, UYI, WYSWYE, and alphanumeric schemes by removing outliers that 
were 2.5 standard deviations above or below an individual participant’s mean for that scheme. 
No outliers were removed for CHC or UYI. Two outliers were removed for WYEWYE and three 
for alphanumeric. No outliers were removed for the gaze-based scheme. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA (authentication scheme: CHC, UYI, WYSWYE, gaze-based, and alphanumeric) was 
conducted to explore login times. Sphericity was violated, and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was used. Differences were found among login times (see figure 7), F(2.21, 70.59) = 12.34, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .278. Post hoc comparisons revealed that UYI (M = 20.22, SD = 10.73) had 
longer login times than CHC (M = 10.97, SD = 5.74), gaze-based (M = 11.98, SD = 6.87), and 
alphanumeric schemes (M = 6.81, SD = 3.24), and WYSWYE (M = 15.84, SD= 11.76) had 























were found between login times for the gaze-based scheme and CHC, p > .99, WYSWYE, p = 
.62, or alphanumeric passcodes, p = .13. No differences were found between login times for 
CHC and WYSWYE, p = .19, or the alphanumeric schemes, p = .44. No differences were found 
between UYI and WYSWYE, p = .34. Alphanumeric passcodes were entered efficiently. 




Figure 7. Login times. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
The researchers also measured login times by considering that when a participant does 
not log in correctly, this would be added to their final login time for when they do login 
correctly. These login times were cleaned for CHC, UYI, WYSWYE, and alphanumeric schemes 
by removing outliers that were 2.5 standard deviations above or below an individual participant’s 





























scheme. One was removed for alphanumeric. A repeated-measures ANOVA (authentication 
scheme: CHC, UYI, WYSWYE, gaze-based, and alphanumeric) was conducted to explore these 
login times. Sphericity was violated, and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used. Differences 
were not found among login times when they were calculated in this way (see figure 8), F(1.05, 




Figure 8. Login times calculated by summing incorrect attempts with next correct attempt. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Learnability. The correct attempts over time were measured to reflect learnability. The 
first three trials for each scheme including the practice trial composed the first rate for 
learnability, the second set of three interactions composed the second, and the third set of three 





























it had fewer trails than the other schemes. In order to include UYI in learnability and allow for 
equivalent practice among schemes, the challenges were considered individually instead of in 
sets of three. A 3 (number of attempts: first set, second set, and third set) x 4 (authentication 
scheme: CHC, UYI, WYSWYE, and alphanumeric) ANOVA was conducted to explore 
learnability. Sphericity was violated, so a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was employed. Main 
effects revealed differences among correct logins for the schemes and differences among correct 
logins over time, p < .001. The main effects were qualified by a two-way interaction between 
learnability and scheme, F(3.65, 69.41) = 2.61, p = .021, partial η2 = .121. When using UYI, 
participant performance with UYI improved with practice, whereas it did not with the other 
schemes (see figure 9). Because there was an interaction, the researchers tested for simple 
effects. Post hoc comparisons revealed differences between the first set and second set and 
between the first set and third set, p < .05 for both comparisons. No differences were found 







Figure 9. Learnability. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
OSA performance. OSA were calculated for the first and second attempts to identify 
passcodes. The researchers calculated what percent of the passcode was identified for each 
attempt. For example, if one out of three images was identified for UYI, the OSA performance 
would be .33. A 2 (OSAs: one viewing and three viewings) x 4 (authentication scheme: CHC, 
UYI, WYSWYE, and gaze-based) ANOVA was conducted to explore OSA performance. The 
alphanumeric password was not tested for OSA resistance, because the password was made 
clearly visible in our prototype. Main effects revealed differences among OSA performances for 
the schemes and differences among OSA performances for the number of viewings, p < .001. 
The main effects were qualified by a two-way interaction between OSAs and scheme, F(3, 51) = 
10.38, p < .001, partial η2 = .379. UYI became vulnerable after three viewings while the other 
schemes did not become more vulnerable with additional viewings (see figure 10). Because of 




























between partial passcodes identified for the schemes after viewing a log in one and three times, p 
< .001, such that viewing videos additional times improved attack performance. Differences 
were found between attack performances on CHC (one observation: M = .06, SD = .13; three 
observations: M = .09, SD = .15) and UYI (one observation: M = .33, SD = .23; three 
observations: M =.80, SD = .20), CHC and WYSWYE (one observation: M = .32, SD = .22; 
three observations: M = .36, SD = .21), UYI and WYSWYE, UYI and the gaze-based scheme 
(one observation: M = .11, SD = .32; three observations: M = .17, SD = .38), and WYSWYE and 
the gaze-based scheme, p < .05 for all comparisons. No difference was found between attack 
performances for CHC and the gaze-based scheme, p = .001. All the schemes offered resistance 
to OSA. UYI was most vulnerable to attack followed by WYSWYE. 
 None of the participants were able to identify a full passcode after viewing a log in one 
time. However, participants identified partial passcodes; this was more likely for UYI and 
WYEWYE. Seventeen participants could not identify any correct icons for CHC on the first 
viewing, and three participants identified one correct icon. Three participants could not identify 
any correct images for WYEWYE, ten participants identified one image, five identified two, and 
two identified three. Four participants identified none for UYI, 12 identified one image, and four 
identified two. Two participants identified the gaze-based pattern by observing where the mouse 
entered and left the interface, which was a problem with our implementation rather than the 
scheme. 
 Given three viewings, no participant identified all of the targets for CHC or WYSWYE. 
Fifteen participants identified no correct icons for CHC, and five identified one. Two participants 
identified no correct images for WYSWYE, nine identified one, seven identified two, and two 
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identified three. UYI was the most vulnerable after three viewings. Nine out of 20 participants 




Figure 10. OSA performance. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Acceptability. Participants were asked whether they would accept added effort the OSA 
prevention requires for each scheme. 80% of participants accepted CHC, 45% accepted UYI, 
50% accepted WYSWYE, and 68.75% accepted the gaze-based scheme. 
STUDY 1: DISCUSSION 
Alphanumeric passcodes had fast login times, which was expected. Login times were also 
appropriate for CHC and the gaze-based scheme. These schemes meet the usability requirement 
of providing quick access. When users are focused on their primary task of interacting with data 































secondary task of authenticating. CHC may allow for different numbers of challenges, e.g., 
participants may click to authenticate once or on multiple subsequent grids of icons. Login times 
were low for CHC because participants completed one challenge to authenticate. The previous 
assessment of CHC had shown much slower login times of 71.66 seconds for multiple challenges 
(Wiedenbeck et al., 2006). Fast login times for CHC were consistent with Behl and colleagues’ 
(2014) five second login times for their grouping scheme and were faster than Sreelatha and 
colleagues (2011) login times of 29.95 seconds. The gaze-based scheme also had appropriate 
login times because the technology enforces selections at a certain pace. Appropriate login times 
for the gaze-based scheme were consistent with previous literature (De Luca et al., 2009). 
WYSWYE and UYI had longer login times. UYI required three image selections on subsequent 
grids to authenticate, and WHSWYE required some mental transformations. Findings of long 
login times for WYSWYE and UYI were consistent with previous research (Hayashi et al., 2008; 
Khot et al., 2012). Shorter login times have been found for other schemes that use the same 
general strategies (Cain & Still, 2016; De Luca et al., 2010; Zangooei et al., 2012). 
There was only a slight, non-significant improvement in errors for CHC and WYSWYE 
during study 1. However, learning was demonstrated for UYI. Once participants figured out what 
the degraded versions looked like through trial and error and feedback from the experimenter, 
participants improved for UYI. Learnability led to the low overall error rates for UYI. The 
quality of learnability that was present for UYI but not the other novel schemes is a shortcoming 
that needs to be addressed by changes in design rather than requiring training.  
Because OSAs were measured using multiple metrics, e.g., one and three viewing and 
number of passcode items identified, the findings can more easily be situated with existing 
literature (Bošnjak & Brumen, 2018). The graphical approaches were found to be resistant to 
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OSA. No graphical passcode was stolen after one viewing. CHC, WHSWYE, and the gaze-based 
scheme continued to offer resistance after three viewings, after which no full passcode was 
stolen. However, UYI became vulnerable after three viewings. Just as participants could learn to 
identify degraded versions of targets and demonstrated learnability throughout the trials for UYI, 
the attackers were also able to learn the identity of degraded targets during additional viewings. 
UYI’s vulnerability to OSA likely applies to other graphical schemes that involve the direct 
selection of static images. Findings that schemes that translate to another location are resistant to 
OSA were consistent with previous literature (Liu et al., 2011b; Sun et al., 2016), and previous 
literature has shown inconsistencies in the security toward OSAs provided by disguising targets 
(Zakaria et al., 2011).  
 There were high rates of acceptance for CHC and gaze-based schemes. There was lower 
acceptance for WYSWYE and UYI. Lower rates of acceptance for WYSWYE aligned with 
previous literature (Khot et al., 2012). Participants may have found it difficult to transform the 
images in WYSWYE and may have been dissatisfied by high error rates.  
 Error rates were quite high for the graphical passcodes but not for the alphanumeric 
scheme. The high error rates found in this within-subject runoff were consistent with Behl and 
colleagues’ (2014) finding of 20% error rates for their grouping scheme, but they were higher 
than some previous assessments of graphical schemes using this strategy (Wiedenbeck et al., 
2006). Error rates were also higher for the scheme that translated targets to another location 
compared to previous studies that showed successful logins (Gupta et al., 2012; Khot et al., 
2012). High error rates likely came from a lack of familiarity and the additional cognitive effort 




CHAPTER 3: STUDY 2: MEMORABILITY RUNOFF 
Study 1 compared four OSA resistant graphical schemes and the alphanumeric scheme on 
dimensions of usability and security. Study 2 added the dimension of memorability by testing 
error rates and verbal memory for passcodes following a three week delay. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty undergraduate students participated in part one, and 18 returned for 
part two (females = 11). They were recruited through the SONA system and compensated with 
class research credit. Two participants reported being left hand dominant. Ages ranged for 18 to 
42 (M = 21.67, SD = 5.60). Reported computer use ranged from 2.5 to 18 hours a day (M = 8.69, 
SD = 4.17). All participants reported normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Stimuli, apparatus, and measures. Stimuli consisted of the same five authentication 
scheme prototypes that were used in Study 1. Study 2 included the System Usability Scale (SUS; 
Brooke, 1996) as a measure of satisfaction. This scale consists of ten items that participants rate 
on a five-point Likert scale. 
Procedure. Participants were run individually. During part one of the study, participants 
were seated in front of a desktop computer, and they signed a consent form. The experimenter 
explained that they would be logging in to five authentication interfaces and that in three weeks 
they would be doing the same thing. They were told that when they come in for part two, they 
would use the same passcodes as during part one, but they would not be reminded what the 
passcodes are. The order in which they logged into each interface was counterbalanced using a 
Latin Square design. For each interface, participants were shown their passcode and asked to 
memorize it. Participants were given instructions and one practice trial. Throughout the trials, the 
experimenter would answer any questions asked but would only volunteer feedback about 
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whether participants had correctly authenticated. Participants logged in using CHC, WYSWYE, 
and alphanumeric passcodes ten times. They logged in using UYI three times, with each login 
consisting of three identifications of targets. They logged in using the gaze-based scheme five 
times. Three weeks later, participants returned and followed the same procedure without being 
shown their passcodes. A three-week delay was used to represent infrequently used passwords 
that would be relatively difficult to remember. 
Results 
Dependent variables in study 2 were error rates and the percent of each passcode 
remembered.  
Memorability. Error rates were calculated for time 1 and time 2 as the number of 
incorrect trials of the experimental trials. The researchers calculated error rates at time 1 and time 
2 for CHC, UYI, WYSWYE, and the alphanumeric scheme. The gaze-based scheme was not 
included in this analysis because of missing data. A 2 (elapsed time: day one or three weeks 
later) x 4 (authentication scheme: CHC, UYI, WYSWYE, and alphanumeric) ANOVA was 
conducted to explore memorability as measured by error rates (see figure 11). Sphericity was 
violated, so a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was employed. Main effects revealed differences 
among error rates for the schemes and differences among error rates for elapsed time, p < .001. 
The main effects were qualified by a two-way interaction between elapsed time and scheme, 
F(1.99, 27.88) = 35.97, p < .001, partial η2 = .072. Error rates for graphical passcodes did not 
differ by elapsed time. However, error rates for the alphanumeric passcode did (see figure 11). 
Simple effects were investigated. A Bonferroni correction was used for post hoc comparisons. 
Post hoc comparisons revealed that time 2 had more errors than time 1, p < .001. The 
alphanumeric scheme (time 1: M = .05, SD = .20; time 2: M = 1.00, SD = .00) had more errors 
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than CHC (time 1: M = .18, SD = .12; time 2: M = .29, SD = .21), UYI (time 1: M = .23, SD = 
.21; time 2: M = .24, SD = .26), and WYSWYE (time 1: M = .30, SD = .19; time 2: M = .25, SD 
= .25), p < .05 for all comparisons. There were no differences found between CHC and UYI, p = 









 For CHC, participants had three targets to remember after a three-week delay. Seven 
percent of participants remembered two icons when asked to vocalize their targets (see figure 
12). Ninety-three percent remembered all three. UYI also consisted of three targets. 14% 



























four targets. Six percent of the participants remembered two, and 57% remembered all four. 82% 
of the participants remembered the gaze-based passcode. No participants remembered the 
alphanumeric password after a three-week delay. All other passcodes had fewer errors during 














































Satisfaction. Satisfaction was measured by the SUS (Brooke, 1996) after the use of each 
scheme on time 1 and time 2. The SUS for the alphanumeric scheme was not measured at time 
two because no passcodes were successfully entered. Due to technical problems with the eye-
tracker and missing data, the gaze-based scheme was also not included in this analysis. A 2 
(elapsed time: day one and three weeks)  x 3 (authentication scheme; CHC, UYI, WYSWYE) 
ANOVA was conducted to explore satisfaction (see figure 14). Sphericity was violated, and a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used. There was no interaction between elapsed time and 
scheme, F(1.25, 18.80) = 0.09, p = .820, partial η2 = .006, which indicated that satisfaction at 
time two did not depend on the scheme. Main effects revealed differences in satisfaction among 
schemes, F(1.85, 18.80) = 10.88, p < .001, partial η2 = .420. There was no main effect for elapsed 










































2: M = 81.88, SD = 11.35), followed by UYI (time 1: M = 64.53, SD = 16.34; time 2: M = 68.59, 





Figure 14. Satisfaction. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
STUDY 2: DISCUSSION 
Evidence was provided for the memorability of all four prototypes of graphical and gaze-
based passcodes. Participants had similar rates of error on day one and three weeks later for these 
schemes. For CHC, WYSWYE, and the gaze-based scheme, most participants verbally 
remembered the whole passcode. Forty percent remembered the whole passcode for UYI. The 
memorability of the graphical schemes was impressive when compared with the alphanumeric 

























weeks later. Remembering the alphanumeric passcode may have been challenging because it was 
long and complex to be secure and because it was system-assigned. However, the graphical 
passcodes and gazed-based scheme were also system-assigned. The memorability for all of the 
schemes would likely have been higher if they had been user-chosen passcodes. However, user-
chosen passcodes can compromise security because users have biases in their selections. For 
example, Pering, Sundar, Light, and Want (2003) allowed users to log in using photographs from 
their smartphone photo galleries. Participants who took on the role of the attacker were able to 
identify 100% of one of the user’s passcodes. Impressively, the graphical passcodes were easily 
remembered, despite being system-assigned, likely due to the picture superiority effect. Muscle 
memory could have also aided the memorability of the gaze-based scheme. Memorability for 
UYI likely benefited from cued-recall. Being able to view the targets leverages cognitive abilities 
for memory (Al Ameen, 2016). Cued-recall would have aided memory for CHC and WYSWYE 
to a lesser extent than UYI because the targets were among many distractors. Findings that the 
grouping scheme and the scheme for translating to another location were memorable was 
consistent with previous literature (Brostoff et al., 2010, Wiedenbeck et al., 2006), and 
memorability for disguising targets and the gaze-based scheme was higher than in previous 
studies in which a drop in success rates were observed after three weeks (Hayashi et al., 2008) 
and after ten days (De Luca et al., 2009). In addition, the satisfaction measure showed that 
participants were more satisfied with CHC and the gaze-based scheme than UYI and WYSWYE. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The current research provided a direct comparison of prototypical examples of graphical 
passcodes and a gaze-based scheme that were designed to thwart OSAs. These schemes were 
classified as providing resistance by grouping targets among distractors, translating targets to 
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another location, disguising targets, and using gaze-input, and they were compared to the 
traditional alphanumeric scheme. The relative strengths of the authentication schemes in terms of 
memorability, quick access, learnability and successful entry, security, and satisfaction were 
determined. 
All four prototypes of graphical and gaze-based passcodes were found to be memorable 
as demonstrated by similar error rates on day one and three weeks later. Memorability for these 
schemes contrasted with the alphanumeric scheme, for which no participant could enter the 
passcode correctly or verbally report it three weeks later.  
The graphical approaches were resistant to OSA. No graphical passcode was stolen after 
one viewing. Partial passcodes were stolen, especially for UYI and WYSWYE, but a casual 
attacker cannot complete an attack with a partial passcode. 
 Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated some of the strengths of graphical passwords, but they also 
found limitations that need to be addressed by additional research. Although the graphical 
schemes offered memorability and resistance to OSA, error rates were high for these schemes 
compared to the familiar alphanumeric scheme. There is a need for strategies that can improve 









CHAPTER 4: EXAMINING THE LIMITS OF MEMORABILITY AND LEVERAGING 
CONTEXT 
Subsequently, two studies investigated a novel intervention to improve encoding and 
retrieval of graphical passcodes by providing context. Previous studies on context-dependent 
memory have provided evidence that cues from the environment that are present during encoding 
can help with future retrieval (Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Smith, 1986). For example, in this 
classic study, participants learned a list of words while they were either underwater or on land, 
and they then recalled the list of words either underwater or on land. Retrieval was facilitated by 
having the same context for learning and recall (Godden & Baddeley, 1975). This basic finding 
of context-dependent memory has been demonstrated with a variety of contextual cues and 
testing conditions. It was also found for the water manipulation when participants were learning 
decompression tables, a tool used by divers (Martin & Aggleton, 1993).  
Location serves as a strong contextual cue. Context-dependent memory has been 
demonstrated in a variety of situations. When participants were asked to perform eyewitness 
testimony, they were better at identifying a confederate when they returned to a fake crime scene 
(Smith & Vela, 1992). Smith (1986) also found context-dependent memory when participants 
better-recalled words learned either in a classroom or a cubicle when recall was in the same 
space as learning. The researchers found the same result when participants performed a forced-
choice recognition task rather than recall, showing that the effect generalizes across memory 
tasks. Musicians learned music and were tested on recall of the piece (Mishra & Backlin, 2007). 
When context was provided by an atypical context (i.e., a lobby or a conference room) and when 
context was provided by an upright or grand piano, recall improved by consistencies between 
context during learning and testing. When learning an action sequence either verbally or through 
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performing it in the context of either a basement or outdoors, recall was better when participants 
were in the same context as when they were learning (Sahakyan, 2010). Cats learned associations 
between tones or lights and shocks (Wickens, Tuber, & Wickens, 1983). They learned and were 
tested in either of two rooms with different décor. The learned associations were stronger when 
tested in the same context. 
Sound can also serve as a contextual cue. Grant et al. (1998) had students learn material 
in either a noisy or silent room. Recall on short answer questions, and recognition on multiple 
choice questions were facilitated when the noise level at testing matched that at learning. When 
context was provided by ambient noise for recall and recognition of virtual objects in virtual 
environments, participants performed best on high fidelity ambient noise than low fidelity noise, 
and they performed worse on no noise (Davis, Scott, Pair, Hodges, & Oliverio, 1999). 
Participants learned information on a desktop computer (Stefanucci, O'Hargan, & Proffitt, 2007). 
Behind the computer, there was either nothing or there was a large screen depicting a scene 
accompanied by ambient noises. Recall of the information was better in the context condition. 
Context facilitating memory was demonstrated when the context is provided by a song (Balch, 
Bowman, & Mohler, 1992; Smith, 1985). After hearing a song during learning, recall was not 
facilitated when there was no song or when the tempo of the song was changed.  
Bodily movements or kinesthetics can serve as a contextual cue. When recalling a list of 
words, chewing gum was found to act as a contextual cue facilitating later retrieval (Baker, 
Bezance, Zellaby, & Aggleton, 2004). Posture (i.e., sitting up or lying down) has been found to 
facilitate recall of nonsense syllables (Rand & Wapner, 1967). Exercise or rest facilitated 
retrieval of a list of words (Miles & Hardman, 1998). 
41 
 
When learning and recalling a passage, odor has even been found to support context-
dependent memory (Pointer & Bond, 1998). Odor also facilitated a context effect for lists of 
words (Schab, 1990).  The odor was particularly effective when it was novel or contextually 
inappropriate (Herz, 1997).  
Context helps with memory for faces and words. Recognition memory is facilitated when 
faces are learned and context is provided by another face accompanying it (Watkins, Ho, & 
Tulving, 1976; Winograd & Rivers-Bulkeley, 1977), and recognition memory is facilitated when 
faces are learned and context is provided by a consistent description of the face (Baddeley, 
1982). Context facilitating memory was demonstrated when participants learned a list of 
nonsense syllables by writing it with either their left or right hand (Nagge, 1935). After 24 hours 
they learned the list again. The dependent variable was how many times through the list it took to 
relearn it, which is called savings. There were more savings when relearning with the same hand 
as the original learning. Font facilitated a context effect for lists of words and nonsense words 
(Kirsner, 1973). Context facilitating memory was found when participants learned a list of words 
presented in one of two voices and then recognized the words among new words presented by 
either the original voice or the other voice (Craik & Kirsner, 1974; Palmeri, Goldinger, & Pisoni, 
1993; Sheffert & Fowler, 1995). Not only did this context intervention increase accuracy, but it 
also increased the speed of responses (Palmeri et al., 1993). Context-dependent memory was 
demonstrated when participants learned two lists of words (Dallett & Wilcox, 1968). They were 
either both learned in lab space, both learned with participants’ heads in a box, or one list was 
learned in one context and the other in the other context. When participants were asked to recall 
the second list, it had fewer intrusions from the first list when it was learned in a different 
context, suggesting the participants had encoded the stimuli in association with its context. When 
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participants learned a list of pairs of words and were asked to recognize them among new pairs, 
they performed better when the list was presented in the same screen location, foreground color, 
and background color during testing as during learning (Murnane & Phelps, 1993). When 
participants learned lists of words on one of two fonts or from one of two male voices, they 
performed better on recognition when the cue was the same during testing as during learning 
(Naveh-Benjamin & Craik, 1995). When participants heard a list of words in either a male or 
female voice and were tested on recognition, they performed better when they heard the list in 
the same voice during testing as during learning (Geiselman & Glenny, 1977). List learning for 
words was also improved when the context was provided by normal vision or vision restricted by 
goggles (Dolinsky, & Zabrucky, 1983). Context facilitating memory was demonstrated when 
participants learned nouns paired with adjectives (Light & Carter-Sobell, 1970). The adjectives 
either gave the same semantic meaning or a different meaning (e.g., official seal or performing 
seal). Participants had better recognition memorably for nouns paired with an adjective giving 
the same semantic meaning during testing as during learning. Cue words present during learning 
were also found to facilitate recall when they were weakly associated with the target words 
(Tulving & Osler, 1968). Also, when words on a list were learned in pairs, participants were 
more likely to remember each word if they also remembered its pair, and when digits were 
learned in pairs, participants were more likely to remember each digit if they remembered its pair 
(Horowitz & Prytulak, 1969). 
Further, simply visualizing the study room can improve recall even if testing occurs in a 
different physical context (Smith, 1979; Smith, 1984). Context facilitating memory also occurred 
when participants were asked to visualize pairs of words interacting with a location but was not 
observed when participants visualized a location not interacting with the words (Winograd & 
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Lynn, 1979). When asked to visualize objects either in a separate frame or being on top of or 
concealed by each other, context improved recall when the objects were visualized as interacting 
(Neisser & Kerr, 1973). When asked to visualize nouns either in the same or separate scenes, 
participants did better on recall and recognition when they imagined them in the same scene 
(Begg, 1973; Begg, 1978). The same result was found for learning pairs of words (Robbins, 
Bray, Irvin, & Wise, 1974). Participants learned word triplets (Petersen, 1974). They were asked 
to either visualize them in a given location or not. During testing, they were either cued with the 
location or with one of the words. They performed best on recall when cued by the location. The 
more integrated a target is with a cue, the better the cue aids memory search. 
Many previous studies have provided support for context facilitating memory. However, 
some have not (Godden & Baddeley, 1980; Johnson & Miles, 2008; Koens, Ten Cate, & Custers, 
2003; Smith, Glenberg, & Bjork, 1978; Strand, 1970). Strand did not find context-dependent 
learning when participants were asked to leave the room they learned the words in before 
returning for recall. It was not found for test scores of college students using the contexts of a 
lecture hall or another room (Saufley, Otaka, & Bavaresco, 1985). Johnson and Miles did not 
find context-dependent memory when the context was provided by the flavor of chewing gum. 
Mishra and Backlin (2007) did not find it for recall of music when context was provided by 
typical locations (i.e., a practice room, a professor’s studio, and a stage) instead of an atypical 
location. Petrich and Chiesi (1976) did not find that context provided by background colors or 
colors of text facilitated learning lists of words. When participants learned faces with 
descriptions, and they recognized the faces either with the same description, a new description, 
or saw the same learned description with a new face, participants tended to identify faces with 
contexts from the studied list (Baddeley & Woodhead, 1982); participants recognized familiar 
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contexts regardless of whether they were integrated with the correct face cue. When participants 
learned pairs of nouns and performed a recognition, a cued-recall, and a free recall test with the 
cue being provided by the first noun in each pair, there was no context effect (Fernandez & 
Glenberg, 1985). Even when the participants were instructed to create a sentence integrating the 
two nouns, there was still no effect of context. Lastly, although Emmerson (1986) found that 
water provided context-dependent memory for recognition memory, Godden and Baddeley did 
not find context-dependent memory for recognition of words learned either underwater or on 
land, and they did not find it for recognition of words paired with cue words. Researchers tend to 
agree that alignment of context between learning and testing environments facilitates retrieval 
(Smith & Vela, 2001). The context provides cues that help with memory search (Smith, 1994; 
Smith & Vela, 2001). However, there must be strong cues from the environment to establish 
contextual memory. It is uncertain how strong contextual cues need to be and whether this 
manipulation would translate to graphical authentication. 
Context and elaboration have even been used to facilitate login performance by previous 
researchers (Bulling et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2011; Sun et al., 2016). Common graphical schemes 
that incorporate context include Cued-Click Points (Bulling et al., 2012), PassPoints 
(Wiedenbeck et al., 2005), and Background Draw a Secret (Dunphy & Yan, 2007). The Cued-
Click Points and PassPoints schemes allow users to log in by clicking points on an image. Draw 
a Secret allows users to log in by drawing a doodle over an image. However, only two studies 
have investigated the effectiveness of providing context. Dunphy and Yan compared 
memorability for Draw a Secret with a background image and Draw a Secret with no background 
image in a sample of 42 participants after one week. Only one participant forgot the passcode in 
each condition. In a second study about the effectiveness of providing a background for Draw a 
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Secret, four out of seven participants remembered the Draw a Secret passcode after 15 days, and 
seven out of nine remembered the Background Draw a Secret passcode after the delay (Arya & 
Agarwal, 2011). This study provided tentative support for context in improving the retrieval of 
graphical passcodes.  
Context is provided in CBFG (Liu, Qiu, Ma, Gao, & Ren, 2011b) and PassMatrix (Sun, 
Chen, Yeh, & Cheng, 2016) in the form of a background image, which is broken into numbered 
cells. Passcodes consist of points on the image. For CBFG, users authenticate by selecting 
numbers on the side of the image corresponding to the cells containing their targets, and for 
PassMatrix, users authenticate by using a scroll bar on the side to select cells containing their 
targets. Context was not manipulated for either of these schemes. Story (Davis, Monrose, & 
Reiter, 2004) is a graphical passcode scheme that presents images on a grid. Designers 
encouraged elaboration by asking participants to construct a story about the images in their 
passcode. The researchers found that their scheme provided for memorable passcodes. However, 
they did not manipulate whether the story intervention was given or not. Furthermore, 50% of 
participants reported that they had neglected to create a story. The “Comes from Draw a Secret” 
(Gao, Ren, Chang, Liu, & Aickelin, 2010) scheme instructs participants to create stories for their 
passcode images in which they connect key objects with a line within a grid. Passcodes for this 
scheme were found to be memorable 100% of the time. However, context was not manipulated 
as part of the experiment, and it was not verified that the participants indeed created stories. 
Context was provided by Li, Sun, Lian, and Giusto’s (2005) graphical scheme, although it was 
not manipulated as an independent variable. To log in users clicked a point on a photograph of a 
room, then they clicked an image on a grid, and then they selected a color on a grid. In another 
spatially focused approach, the Memory Palace scheme (Lu, Lee, Das, & Hong, 2016) allowed 
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participants to log in by tracing a path through a set of 3-D rooms. This scheme provided 
memorable passcodes, but again context was not experimentally examined. These previous 
studies suggest that graphical passcodes’ memorability can be boosted through context or 
elaboration. However, there is a need for research that determines a causal role for context in 
retrieving graphical passcodes.  
If context can improve error rates of graphical schemes, this may not only help with 
improving interactions with these novel approaches; it may also help with potential limitations 
for memorability when users need to remember multiple graphical passcodes or longer graphical 
passcodes. As technology continues to advance, users are making use of more and more services. 
Each service requires a unique password (Barton & Barton, 1984). As a result, users have many 
passwords they need to remember, although most studies about graphical passcodes only have 
users remember one. Even studies that examine the use of multiple graphical passcodes have 
only required users to remember as many as four (Johnson & Werner, 2008; Schaub et al., 2013). 
An ecological study about alphanumeric password use found that users need to remember an 
average of eight passwords (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011). In their study, participants had 
trouble remembering their passwords and would frequently write them down or use common 
words or names. Although this research has shown that users have trouble remembering multiple 
alphanumeric passcodes, no study has determined the limits of memorability for graphical 
passcodes.  
The third and fourth proposed studies filled a need by determining whether providing 
context in the form of a background image can facilitate retrieval of target images in a traditional 
grid-based graphical passcode scheme. It was hypothesized that context-dependent memory 
would increase the memorability of passcodes.  
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Furthermore, the proposed studies demonstrated the limits of memorability for graphical 
passcodes providing an indication of their applicability. Study 3 examined the number of 
passcodes that can be recalled after a 3 week delay (4, 8, or 12). Previous research has shown 
that humans have an almost limitless memory for pictures (Standing, 1973; Standing et al., 
1970). Pictures are better remembered than words because of the picture superiority effect 
(Paivio, 1979), which describes a separate and stronger visual than verbal code. Bartram (1974) 
provided evidence for the picture superiority effect. Participants practiced naming objects. 
Objects were either the same each time, were viewed from a different angle each time, or were 
different objects with the same name. Naming latency was fastest for naming 2d and 3d objects, 
which relied on a visual code, and were slowest for naming different objects, which relied on a 
verbal code. Bruce (1982) also found evidence of a stronger, separate pictorial code. Participants 
performed yes-no recognition tests for pictures of unfamiliar faces. The faces were either the 
same as the learning phase, were rotated, had a different expression, or were rotated and had a 
different expression. Participants were fastest and more accurate for unchanged faces. Rotation 
or changed expressions were faster than rotation and changed expression. When participants 
learned familiar faces and recognized them from either the same view, from a changed angle, or 
with a changed expression, familiar faces were also recognized more slowly with changes, 
suggesting the pictorial code helped speed responses.  
Shepard (1967) compared recognition memory for 600 words, sentences, and pictures. 
With no delay, participants remembered 90% of words, 88% of sentences, and 98% of words. 
After a week, recognition memory for pictures was the same as words and sentences without any 
delay. Participants were able to recognize 90% of a set of 2,560 pictures after a four-day delay, 
and they were able to recognize 99% of a set of 1000 pictures after a four-day delay (Standing et 
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al., 1970). In alignment with findings of almost limitless memory for pictures in forced-choice 
recognition tasks (Standing et al., 1970), it was hypothesized that there would not be a decrement 
in memorability when participants need to remember multiple passcodes after a three week 






















CHAPTER 5: CAPACITY LIMITS FOR MULTIPLE GRAPHICAL PASSCODES 
Method 
Participants. Forty-two undergraduate students participated (females = 24). They were 
recruited through the SONA system and compensated with class research credit or were recruited 
with fliers and compensated with $20. Eight participants reported being left hand dominant. 
Ages ranged from 18 to 40 (M = 23.45, SD = 5.63). Reported computer use ranged from 3 to 18 
hours a day (M = 8.43, SD = 4.44). All participants reported normal or corrected to normal 
vision. 
Stimuli. Stimuli were presented in Paradigm©. Nine degraded images that were 112x90 
pixels were displayed on a 3x3 grid. Images were degraded by removing detail but retaining 
general colors and shapes. This was accomplished by applying the oilify filter in Gimp© and 
using brushstroke 16. One image was the target on each grid. In the context condition, a scene 
was displayed containing the passcode targets during the first login (see figure 15). Scenes 
included were a porch, a park, a swimming pool, a store, a forest, a school, a mountain, an office, 
a living room, a river, a beach, and a movie theater. The scene was 800x532 pixels. Then on 




Figure 15. A passcode placed on a background scene.  
 
 
Procedure. Participants sat in front of a computer and were presented with a passcode 
consisting of three, whole target images. Then in the context condition only, the participants saw 
their passcode on a background scene. For example, the three target images appeared on a beach. 
Then they logged in one time for practice followed by nine experimental trials. They selected the 
three degraded versions of their targets on three subsequent 3x3 grids. They repeated this 
procedure with either four, eight, or 12 passcodes. The number of passwords and the presence of 
context was counterbalanced between participants using a Latin Square design. For each 
participant, the software collected error rates. There were 12 total conditions, but each participant 
only experienced two conditions. There were 120 trials per condition for four passcodes, 240 for 





STIMULI DEVELOPMENT STUDY 
 In order to build the stimuli for studies 3 and 4, the researchers needed to determine the 
appropriate level of distortion for the images. Hayashi et al., 2008 performed a pilot study 
consisting of six participants to determine appropriate distortion levels when manipulating brush 
size in the oil painting filter. Participants viewed images at varying levels of distortion. First, 
they viewed the images starting with the highest level of distortion, and they were asked when 
they first recognize an image. Their answers to this question showed when an attacker would be 
able to steal a target. Second, they viewed the images starting from the least distortion, and they 
were asked when they could no longer recognize each image. Their answers to this question 
showed how well users would be able to recognize their targets. Hayashi and colleagues found 
that for an image that is 56x56 pixels, the appropriate level of distortion is brush size 8. At this 
level, users can recognize their targets and attackers cannot steal the targets. The current 
researchers collected a large set of images and replicated Hayashi and colleagues’ pilot study 
with a larger participant sample. 
Method  
Participants. Twenty undergraduate students were recruited through SONA and 
compensated with class research credit. There were 16 females. Ages ranged from 18 to 30 (M = 
20.10, SD = 3.3). Four participants reported left-handedness. English was reported as the first 
language of all participants except two who spoke Spanish before learning English. All 
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Stimuli. Twenty images of objects were collected. The objects belonged to different 
classes. For example, there was only one image of a dog, rather than having images of different 
kinds of dogs. Each image was 112x90 pixels and was distorted using the oil painting filter in 
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Gimp©. Brush strokes were at levels of 10, 13, 16, 19, and 22. Brush strokes at level 16 for 
112x90 pixels was equivalent to the appropriate brush stroke level of 8 for 56x56 pixels found by 
Hayashi et al., 2008). The images were printed and stacked in order of increasing distortion.  
Procedure. Participants were first asked when they recognized images. They were shown 
each image at decreasing levels of distortion. They were then shown each whole image ask asked 
when they no longer recognize it. They were shown each image at increasing levels of distortion. 
Results and Discussion 
 The average brush stroke at which participants could recognize an unfamiliar image was 
3.46 (SD = 6.61). The average brush stroke at which participants could recognize a familiar 
image was 16.08 (SD = 4.47). A paired samples t-test revealed that differences between the 
responses to the two questions were significant, t(399) = 45.42, p = <.001, d = 2.27. As attackers, 
participants were not able to steal targets unless they were at very low levels of distortion. As 
users, participants could recognize images at brush stroke levels of 16. These findings confirm 
that the level of brush strokes used by Hayashi and colleagues (2008) is also appropriate for the 
images the researchers collected. 
STIMULI ASSOCIATIONS STUDY 
 The objects and scenes were selected for studies 3 and 4 such that the objects were 
assumed to be unrelated to the scenes. The current study was performed to verify that the stimuli 
indeed were unrelated. If it is found that the stimuli are related to the images, this could present a 
confound because the context intervention is designed to be independent of the passcode that is 
assigned. If a contextual image is related to the passcode, this would provide potential attackers 
with clues about a passcode. To avoid this security risk, the stimuli association study was 
designed as a priming study that measures associations among stimuli using reaction times. 
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Reaction times from priming experiments can reflect how well two stimuli are related to each 
other (Neill, Lissner, & Beck, 1990; Tipper, MacQueen, & Brehaut, 1988). It is theorized that 
when two targets are associated, reaction times will be faster than for unrelated targets; 
underlying neural connectivity speeds reaction times (Bharucha & Stoeckig, 1986). For example, 
when participants heard two chords that were either related harmonically or unrelated, they 
identified whether the second chord was major or minor more quickly when it was related to the 
first chord than when it was unrelated (Bharucha & Stoeckig, 1986).  
Method  
Participants. Twenty undergraduate students were recruited through SONA and 
compensated with class research credit. There were 16 females. Ages ranged from 18 to 47 (M = 
21.5, SD = 7.32). Two participants reported left-handedness. English was reported as the first 
language of all participants except three. All participants had normal or corrected to normal 
vision. 
Stimuli. Twelve images of scenes and 36 images of objects, which were used in studies 3 
and 4, were included. Because images from studies 3 and 4 were the experimental stimuli, ten 
more images of objects and scenes were added to compile the unrelated condition, and ten 
images of objects and scenes were added for the related condition. Objects and scenes that were 
related and unrelated to each other were determined using an associations database of semantic 
associations (Nelson, McEvoy,  & Schreiber, 2004). The database consists of 5,019 words. 6,000 
participants had responses with associations between the words. When they saw the first word, 
they responded with the first word that came to their minds that was related to it. The objects and 
scenes collected for this study were found on creative commons following the same procedure as 
in studies 3 and 4. The only difference between the stimuli for the related, unrelated, and 
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previously used stimuli was the semantic associations (see figure 16 for examples of stimuli). An 
additional 30 images of objects and 60 images of scenes were added for non-critical trials. All 
scenes were 550x360 pixels, and all objects were 112x90 pixels. 
 
 
(a)    
(b)   
Figure 16. (a)A related object and scene. (b) An unrelated object and scene. 
 
 
 Procedure. Images were presented in Paradigm©. The software recorded correct 
responses and reaction times. The current study adopts a “same-different” methodology from 
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Neill and colleagues’ previous priming study. In the previous study, participants saw a fixation 
cross, and then a string of letters briefly flashed on the screen. Participants indicated whether the 
first and last letters in the string were the same or different. In the current study, there were 60 
total trials, 30 of which were “same,” critical trials, and 30 of which were “different,” non-
critical trials. Participants first saw a fixation cross and hit the space bar when they were ready. 
Then they saw an image of a scene for 150 milliseconds, the same time used in a previous same-
different, priming experiment (Tipper et al., 1988). The scene was followed by an object for 150 
milliseconds, and then a scene for 150 milliseconds. Then on a blank screen, participants typed y 
if the scenes were the same and n if they were different. Of the 30 “same” trials, ten images were 
from studies 3 and 4, ten were related, and ten were unrelated. Trials were presented in a random 
order. Because there were more than ten object and scenes in studies 3 and 4, the images from 
the previous studies were randomly distributed in the ten trials. 
Results  
The hypothesis was investigated that the stimuli coming from studies 3 and 4 would be 
different from the related stimuli and that the unrelated stimuli would also be different from the 
related stimuli. A repeated-measures ANOVA (type of stimuli: related, unrelated, from studies 3 
and 4) was run to investigate the association among stimuli and background scenes. Data were 
cleaned by removing outliers beyond 2.5 standard deviations from the mean at the participant 
level. Sphericity was violated, so a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was employed. There were no 
differences among the stimuli conditions, F(1.04, 19.87) = 0.07, p = .385, partial η2 = .041, 





Study 3: Results 
Memorability as Measured by Success Rates by Login. Success rates by login were 
calculated as the number of correct logins of the total logins. Each login consists of three trials. 
A 2 (delay: immediate or three weeks) x 2 (context: yes or no) x 3 (number of passcodes: 4, 8, or 
12) split plot ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact on success rates by login. No 
interaction was found among delay, context, and the number of passcodes, p > .05. There was an 
interaction between delay and context (see figures 17 and 18), F(1, 36) = 8.51, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .321, such that there was a larger difference between time 1 and 2 for the no context 
condition compared to the context condition. However, this difference was observed because of 
better performance at time 1 for the no context condition rather than better performance at time 2 
for the context condition. A difference was found between the delay conditions, F(1, 36) = 0.05, 
p = .819, partial η2 = .001, such that participants performed better during time 1 (M = .95; SD = 
.16) than time 2 (M =.62; SD = .27). There was no difference between context and no context, 
F(1, 36) = 3.45, p = .071, partial η2 = .088. A post hoc power analysis showed that that same size 
of 42 would provide for a power of .015 for an effect size of this size. There was an interaction 
found between delay and number of passcodes (see figure 17 and 18), F(2, 36) = 8.51, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .321. Post hoc comparisons revealed that, collapsing across delay and context, there 
was no difference between 4 and 8 passcodes, 8 and 12 passcodes, or 4 and 12 passcodes, p > .05 
for all. Differences were not observed between 4 (M = .97, SD = .06) and 12 passcodes (M = .98, 
SD = .03) at time 1 but were observed between 4 (M = .79, SD = .21) and 12 passcodes (M = .47, 
SD = .27) after a delay. A linear regression analysis was performed to check if there was a flat 
trend between error rates and the number of passcodes. It was found that there was a relationship 









































































Memorability as Measured by Success Rates by Trial. Success rates by trial were 
calculated as the number of correct trials of the total trials. The data were cleaned by removing 
outliers that were more than 2.5 standard deviations above and below the mean for all 
participants. One participant was removed. A 2 (delay: immediate or three weeks) x 2 (context: 
yes or no) x 3 (number of passcodes: 4, 8, or 12) split plot ANOVA was conducted to explore the 
impact on success rates by trial. There was no interaction found among delay, context, and 
number of passcodes and no interaction found between delay and context, p > .05 for all. There 
was an interaction found between delay and number of passcodes (see figure 19), F(2, 35) = 
10.64, p < .001, partial η2 = .378, such that performance declined at time 2 but only for 12 
passcodes. During time 1, participants performed similarly regardless of the number of passcodes 
(M for 4 passcodes = .99; SD = .02; M for 8 passcodes = .95; SD = .13; M for 12 passcodes = .99; 
SD = .01). After three weeks, participants still performed similarly for 4 and 8 passcodes (M for 
4 passcodes = .92; SD = .07; M for 8 passcodes = .82; SD = .13), but performance dropped for 12 
passcodes (M for 12 passcodes = .72; SD = .17). A difference was found between the delay 
conditions, F(1, 35) = 72.87, p < .001, partial η2 = .676, such that participants performed better 
during time 1 (M = .99; SD = .02) than time 2 (M =.83; SD = .15). There was no difference 
between context and no context, F(1, 35) = 0.36, p = .551, partial η2 = .010. A linear regression 
analysis found that there was a relationship between number of passcodes and error rates at time 




Figure 19. Success rates by trial. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Memorability as Measured by Login Time per Login. Login times per login were 
calculated for correct, experimental logins. The data were cleaned by removing outliers that were 
more than 2.5 standard deviations above and below the mean at the participant level. A 2 (delay: 
immediate or three weeks) x 2 (context: yes or no) x 3 (number of passcodes: 4, 8, or 12) split 
plot ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact on login times per login. There was no 
interaction found among delay, context, and number of passcodes, between delay and context, or 
between delay and number of passcodes, p > .05 for all. A difference was found between the 
delay conditions (see figure 20), F(1, 36) = 15.44, p < .001, partial η2 = .300, such that 
participants performed faster during time 1 (M = 5.31; SD = 1.94) than time 2 (M = 6.25; SD = 
1.88). There was no difference between context and no context, F(1, 36) = 0.26, p = .616, partial 
η2 = .007. Post hoc comparisons revealed that collapsing across delay and context, there was no 
































Figure 20. Login time per login. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Memorability as Measured by Login Time per Trial. Login times per trial were 
calculated for correct, experimental trials. The data were cleaned by removing outliers that were 
more than 2.5 standard deviations above and below the mean at the participant level. A 2 (delay: 
immediate or three weeks) x 2 (context: yes or no) x 3 (number of passcodes: 4, 8, or 12) split 
plot ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact on login times per trial. There was a three 
way interaction found among delay, context, and number of passcodes, F(2, 36) = 4.27, p = .022, 
partial η2 = .192. Login times per trial were slowed for the 12 passcode condition, but only at 
time 2 and when there was context provided. There was no interaction found between delay and 
context or between delay and number of passcodes, p > .05 for both. A difference was found 
between the delay conditions (see figure 21 and 22), F(1, 36) = 39.31, p < .001, partial η2 = .522, 
such that participants performed faster during time 1 (M = 1.71; SD = 4.07) than time 2 (M = 








































.585, partial η2 = .008. Post hoc comparisons revealed that, collapsing across delay, there was no 













































Figure 22. Login time per trial. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Memorability as Measured by Login Time per Login Including Incorrect Attempts. 
Login times were calculated for correct experimental logins including the time for the previous 
incorrect attempts. The data were cleaned by removing outliers that were more than 2.5 standard 
deviations above and below the mean at the participant level. A 2 (delay: immediate or three 
weeks) x 2 (context: yes or no) x 3 (number of passcodes: 4, 8, or 12) split plot ANOVA was 
conducted to explore the impact on login times. The researchers collapsed across number of 
attempts. There was no interaction found among delay, context, and number of passcodes, 
between delay and context, or between delay and number of passcodes, p > .05 for all. There was 
no difference between delay conditions, p > .05, or between context and no context, F(1, 36) = 
0.87, p = .357, partial η2 = .024. Post hoc comparisons revealed that collapsing across delay and 
context, there was no difference between 4 and 8 passcodes, 8 and 12 passcodes, or 4 and 12 




































passcodes. Participants either remembered their passcode and logged in quickly, or they had 






























































CHAPTER 6: STUDY 4: CAPACITY LIMITS FOR LONGER GRAPHICAL 
PASSCODES 
In addition to memorability issues associated with multiple graphical passcodes, the 
proposed research also assessed limitations for remembering long passwords. In many 
authentication systems, there is a threat of brute force attacks. The best way to defend against a 
brute force attack is to use a large password space (Suo, Zhu, & Owen, 2005). For example, 
alphanumeric passwords have the password space of 94^N, where 94 is the number of available 
characters on a keyboard, and N is the length of a password (Suo et al., 2005). Just as 
alphanumeric passwords are encouraged to be long, the security of graphical passcodes also 
benefits from the length. There are well-established rules for making strong alphanumeric 
passwords by making them long and complex. No previous studies have examined the impact of 
similarly making graphical passcodes more secure by making them longer. Lengthy 
alphanumeric passwords are difficult to remember, and so they have a limited dimensional space. 
However, graphical passcodes allow for almost limitless recognition memory (Standing, 1973; 
Standing et al., 1970) producing a larger dimensional space that offers greater resistance to brute 
force attacks. 
The fourth proposed study attempted to leverage context-dependent memory to improve 
memorability similarly to the goal of study 3. Furthermore, study 4 determined the length of a 
passcode that can be remembered after the delay (3, 8, or 13 images). It was hypothesized that 
there would not be a decrement in memorability when participants need to remember longer 






Study 4 is the same as study 3 except that participants logged in with only one passcode, 
but it will have either three, eight, or 13 targets in it. The only scene included was a forest.  
Participants. Forty-two undergraduate students participated (females = 22). They were 
recruited through the SONA system and compensated with class research credit or were recruited 
with fliers and compensated with $20. Two participants reported being left hand dominant. Ages 
ranged from 18 to 40 (M = 22.76, SD = 4.93). Reported computer use ranged from 2 to 15 hours 
a day (M = 7.19, SD = 3.84). All participants reported normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Results  
Memorability was measured as overall error rates at time 1 and three weeks later as well 
as login times at time 1 and 2. A 3 (number of attempts: first three, second three, or third three) x 
2 (delay: immediate or three weeks) x 2 (context or no context) x 3 (length of passcode: 3, 8, or 
13) split plot ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact on error rates. Delay and number of 
attempts are a within-subjects variables, and context and length are between-subjects variables. 
Bonferroni corrections were used for all post hoc comparisons.  
Memorability as Measured by Success Rates by Login. Success rates by login were 
calculated in the same way as in study 3. The researchers conducted a 2 (delay: immediate or 
three weeks) x 2 (context: yes or no) x 3 (length of passcode: 3, 8, or 13) split plot ANOVA was 
conducted to explore the impact on error rates. There were no differences found among delay, 
context, and number of passcodes, there was no interaction between delay and context, between 
delay and length of passcode, or between context and length of passcode, p > .05 for all (see 
figure 24). A difference was not found between the delay conditions, p > .05, between context 
and no context, F(1, 36) = 3.45, p = .071, partial η2 = .088. A post hoc power analysis showed 
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that that same size of 42 would provide for a power of .015 for an effect size of this size for 
context and no context. Post hoc comparisons revealed that, collapsing across delay, there was 
no difference between performance for passcodes of length 3 (M = .95, SD = .12) and 8 (M = .75, 
SD = .38), p = .18. Differences were observed between performance on passcodes of length 3 
and 13 (M = .19, SD = .36) and between performance on passcodes of length 8 and 13, p < .001 
for both. A linear regression analysis was performed to check if there was a flat trend between 
error rates and the length of passcodes. It was found that there was a linear relationship between 




Figure 24. Success rates by login. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Memorability as Measured by Success Rates by Trial. Success rates by trial were 
































than 2.5 standard deviations above and below the mean for all participants. One participant was 
removed. The researchers conducted a 2 (delay: immediate or three weeks) x 2 (context: yes or 
no) x 3 (length of passcode: 3, 8, or 13) split plot ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact 
on error rates. There were no differences found among delay, context, and number of passcodes, 
there was no interaction between delay and context, between delay and length of passcode, or 
between context and length of passcode, p > .05 for all (see figure 25).  A difference was not 
found between the delay conditions, p > .05, between context and no context, F(1, 35) = 0.01, p 
= .928, partial η2 = .000. Post hoc comparisons revealed that, collapsing across delay and context, 
there was no difference between performance for passcodes length 3 (M = .98, SD = .04) and 8 
(M = .88, SD = .17) or length 8 and 13 (M = .82, SD = .14), p > .05 for both. There was a 
difference between performance for passcodes length 3 and 13, p = .005. A linear regression 
analysis found that there was a relationship between number of passcodes and error rates at time 







Figure 25. Success rates by trial. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Memorability as Measured by Login Time per Login. Login times per login were 
calculated in the same way as in study 3. Fourteen participants could not be included in this 
analysis because they did not correctly login at least one time. As the majority of unsuccessful 
logins were in the condition of passcodes of length 13, the analysis could not be completed for 
this dependent variable. 
Memorability as Measured by Login Time per Trial. Login times per trial were 
calculated in the same way as in study 3. The data were cleaned by removing outliers that were 
more than 2.5 standard deviations above and below the mean at the participant level. A 2 (delay: 
immediate or three weeks) x 2 (context: yes or no) x 3 (length of passcode: 3, 8, or 13) split plot 
ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact on login times per trial. There were no differences 
found among delay, context, and length of passcode, and there was no interaction found between 
































passcode, p > .05 for all. A difference was found between the delay conditions (see figure 26), 
F(1, 36) = 19.34, p < .001, partial η2 = .349, such that participants performed faster during time 1 
(M = 2.88; SD = 1.74) than time 2 (M = 2.01; SD = 6.33). There was no difference between 
context and no context, F(1, 36) = 1.13, p = .295, partial η2 = .030. Post hoc comparisons 
revealed that collapsing across delay and context, there was no difference between 3 and 13 or 8 
and 13 passcodes, p > .05 for both. Participants performed faster for 3 passcodes (M = 1.78; SD 
= 4.56) than 8 (M = 3.07; SD = 1.94), p = .006. There was a bimodal distribution resulting in 




Figure 26. Login time per trial. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Memorability as Measured by Login Time per Login Including Incorrect Attempts. 




































incorrect attempts. Thirteen participants could not be included in this analysis because they did 
not correctly login at least one time. As the majority of unsuccessful logins were in the condition 
of passcodes of length 13, the analysis could not be completed for this dependent variable. 
DISCUSSION 
There was a smaller difference found between time 1 and 2 when context was provided 
for the for the eight passcode condition when compared to the no context condition when error 
rates were measured by login, which would partially support the hypothesis that context would 
improve memorability for multiple graphical passcodes. However, this difference was observed 
because of differences between performance at time 1 rather than at time 2. The prediction that 
context would improve memorability was based on previous literature that consistent context 
facilitates retrieval (Godden & Baddeley, 1975). Context did not improve memorability for the 
four or 12 passcode conditions, and it did not improve memorability when errors were coded by 
trial. Future research should continue to explore avenues for improving memorability. For 
example, a background image may not have been a strong enough context intervention, but 
possibly a more immersive visual or auditory experience at login could improve memorability 
for more than eight passcodes. 
When participants needed to remember longer passcodes, I expected that at time 2 rates 
for memorability would be improved for the context condition compared to the no context 
condition. However, the context condition did not facilitate memorability, and memorability was 
not demonstrated in either condition. In previous studies that demonstrated context facilitating 
memory, the context interventions were strong. For example, participants were in different 
settings, such as on land or submerged underwater (Godden & Baddeley, 1975) or in a basement 
or outdoors (Sahakyan, 2010). A strong context intervention such as these was not possible in the 
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application of a graphical passcode because the context needed to be presented on a computer 
monitor. It was likely that the context intervention was not strong enough to improve 
memorability, even though some previous studies have found a context effect for seemingly 
weak context interventions (e.g., listening to music (Balch, Bowman, & Mohler, 1992; Smith, 
1985) or chewing gum (Baker, Bezance, Zellaby, & Aggleton, 2004)). A background scene on a 
computer motor has been found to provide context effects (Stefanucci et al., 2007). However, in 
that instance, there was a very large monitor accompanied by ambient noises. Context has not 
been found for other studies that use smaller manipulations, such as background colors (Petrich 
& Chiesi, 1976) or the flavor of chewing gum (Johnson & Miles, 2008). It is also possible that 
the context intervention was not successful because it confused or distracted participants from 
their primary goal. Future research could consider whether a stronger context condition could be 
provided or whether the purpose of the context could be clarified so as not to confuse 
participants. Future research could potentially make the context intervention stronger by 
including only targets and distractors that are associated with the background scenes to allow for 
a greater depth of processing. If the distractors as well as the targets were associated with the 
scenes, this would not present a security weakness because the targets would not stand out as the 
only associated images. 
The weak context intervention that was used for studies 3 and 4 was selected because this 
research builds on previous studies in the domain of authentication, which have incorporated 
context but have not tested the effectiveness of the manipulation. These studies have used 
context interventions such as asking participants to think of stories that include their passcode 
(Davis et al., 2004; Gao et al., 2010) or allowing participants to authenticate by selecting points 
on background images (Bulling et al., 2012; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005). Because studies 3 and 4 
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used similarly subtle context interventions, a contribution was made to the literature that the 
effectiveness of context interventions in the domain of authentication cannot be assumed. 
I predicted that there would not be differences in error rates after the delay regardless of 
the number of passcodes that participants need to remember. This prediction was based on 
previous findings of participants’ almost limitless memory for pictures (Standing et al., 1970). 
When success rates were coded by login, there was no difference between 4, 8 and 12 passcodes 
after the delay. This measure is less sensitive than measuring success rates by trial because a 
login requires that all three trials be successful. When success rates were measured by trial, there 
was no difference in performance on 4 or 8 passcodes after the delay. Performance dropped only 
for 12 passcodes, the most challenging condition, although they were still at an acceptable 72% 
(Behl et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2011a). Memory for the passcodes may not have been as limitless as 
picture memory has been found to be in previous studies because the images were degraded. The 
applied finding of this study is noteworthy because it has demonstrated that participants can 
remember eight, system-assigned passcodes after a three-week delay. Therefore, graphical 
authentication may be an effective solution for the problem of memorability that accompanies 
the proliferation of services for which users need to identify themselves. However, 12 passcodes 
were difficult to remember after three weeks. It may be that having the same scheme, e.g., Use 
Your Illusion (UYI), of graphical authentication for 12 accounts may be too much. Future 
research should investigate whether having different types of graphical schemes can meet the 
need to remember passcodes for more than eight accounts. For example, possibly participants 
can remember six passcodes consisting of degraded images for UYI and concurrently six 
passcodes consisting of icons for CHC successfully. 
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I predicted that there would not be differences in error rates after the delay regardless of 
the length of passcodes that participants needed to remember. When success rates were coded by 
login, there was no difference between length three and eight or eight and 13, but performance 
dropped from length three to 13. When success rates were measured by trial, there was no 
difference in performance for length three and eight, but there was a difference between eight 
and 13 and between three and 13. As in study 3, memory for degraded images has been found 
not to be limitless, demonstrated by the most challenging condition. These findings are 
noteworthy because, while longer passcodes are desirable in high-security situations to increase 
bit strength, passcodes of length 13 have been found to be detrimental to memorability. To 
increase security, passcodes could be lengthened from three to eight without problems with 
performance. This memorability experiment challenged participants to remember a system-
assigned passcodes after three weeks. It is desirable to use system-assigned graphical passcodes 
to avoid user biases. However, future research could investigate whether it is possible that a 
password that is used more often than every three weeks could allow for passcodes longer than 
eight. 
The researchers also measured login times because faster login times may demonstrate 
ease of retrieval from memory. There were no differences among login time among the numbers 
of passcodes, and login times were only found to be faster at time 1 than after the delay. These 
findings may suggest that four, eight, and 12 passcodes were received with similar ease, but 
these findings are inconclusive. When participants logged in with longer passcodes, login times 
could not be analyzed per login because most participants could not successfully login for 
passcodes of length 13. When analyzed per trial, shorter passcodes were found to be retrieved 
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from memory more quickly than longer passcodes, suggesting that when security is less 
important, shorter passcodes will be more usable.  
Based on the findings about the number and length of passcodes, it was noted that 
participants had better memory three weeks later for multiple short passcodes than one longer 
passcode. Previous studies that have examined long-term memory for visual objects have also 
found that memory is better for a smaller set size (Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2008; 
Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010a; Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010b; Zhao & 
Turk-Browne, 2011). Konkle and colleagues showed participants a set of 2,800 pictures. Each 
picture depicted an item, such as a hat or a butterfly. Pictures were presented for three seconds, 
each separated by a mask. Within the set of pictures, there were either one, two, four, eight, or 16 
exemplars of each item, meaning there were sets of, for example, one or multiple hats. After a 
ten-minute break, participants performed a forced-choice recognition task. The performance was 
better for smaller set sizes of exemplars. 
Similarly, when participants saw a set of 2,500 pictures and performed a forced-choice 
recognition task, participants were found to perform better for pictures that were of different 
object classes than the same object class (Brady et al., 2008). Better memory for smaller set sizes 
extends to scenes as well as objects (Konkle et al., 2010b). Participants viewed 3,000 scenes and 
performed a forced-choice recognition task. During the presentation, scenes were either 
unrelated or from a set of four, 16, or 64 related scenes. Participants performed better for smaller 
set sizes. Participants have also performed better for smaller set sizes when reporting numerosity 
(Zhao & Turk-Browne, 2011). They viewed objects and indicated whether each was natural or 
artificial. Each object was either unrelated to the other objects or belonged within a set of 
exemplars ranging from one to ten. After a break, participants reported how many times they had 
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seen each class of object. Numerosity reports were more accurate with smaller sets of exemplars. 
These previous studies employ exemplars from existing, natural categories. Future research 
should investigate memory for sets that are newly formed, similar to images used in UYI and 
other graphical passcodes. 
Set size has also been examined for contextual or associative learning. Voss (2009) 
specifically examined set size and associative long-term memory. The experimenter learned left-
right button associations with a set of 4,980 pictures. He learned 30 associations in the first 
session, and he added 30 pictures in each subsequent session. Four hours after each learning 
session, he would test himself. He performed better with a smaller set of associations (e.g., 85% 
correct for 1,000 pictures) compared to a larger set (e.g., 65% correct for about 5,000 pictures). 
Previous studies that have examined set size and long-term memory only observed 
limitations in long-term memory for pictures for huge databases of pictures. The current studies 
observed limitations for much smaller picture sets. However, this is not surprising because in the 
current studies 3 and 4, participants were tasked with remembering pictures that were degraded. 
Loftus, Kaufman, Nishimoto, and Ruthruff (1992) demonstrated that when images are degraded, 
it should be expected to observe greater limitations in long-term memory. Participants saw 
images of scenes such as farmland and then performed a recognition task. Each image was 
viewed for between 55 and 400 milliseconds. A subset of the images was degraded by removing 
contrast. Participant either viewed degraded images both at learning and at testing or at neither 
learning nor testing. Participants performed better when images were consistently either 
degraded or clean at learning and testing, and they performed better overall for recognizing clean 
than degraded images. Similar to findings of studies 3 and 4 of the current research, participants 
present greater limitations in long-term memory when there is less encoding specificity, such as 
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when they are presented with a whole image for UYI and asked to recognize a degraded image, 
and when the features that are encoded during learning are not present when recognizing 
degraded images. 
In addition, the memory limitation observed in studies 3 and 4 can be accounted for by 
the design of these experiments compared with previous studies that have found almost limitless 
memory for pictures. In previous studies, participants performed forced-choice recognition tasks, 
selecting between a picture that was previously learned and a new picture (Standing et al., 1970). 
The learned picture could be relatively easily identified because it produced a familiarity signal, 
while the new picture did not. Studies 3 and 4 tasked participants with identifying a learned 
target from a set of eight distractors. All the of distractors were recycled for each login because if 
the distractors changed, this would produce a risk of intersection attack. Therefore the targets and 
the distractors would both produce familiarity signals, and it was likely more challenging for the 













CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
Our goal is to further develop usable security theory from a human-centered perspective 
while operating under the necessary security constraints. The first two studies benchmarked the 
relative strengths and weaknesses among schemes that use common strategies to provide OSA 
resistance. Prototypical schemes were selected that represented commonly used strategies to 
provide OSA resistance, including grouping targets among distractors, translating targets to 
another location, disguising targets, and using gaze-based input. These schemes were measured 
by a variety of dependent variables, and they were compared with the alphanumeric approach. 
Dependent measures included error rates, learnability, login times, memorability, acceptance, 
satisfaction, and OSA performance. OSA performance was measured given one viewing of a 
login, three viewings, and the percent of passcodes identified.  
Numerous dependent variables were used to benchmark the schemes to produce 
generalizability to a wide range of previous literature. Previous literature tends to use just a few 
dependent variables. By including many measures (e.g., by measuring OSA performance in 
multiple ways), findings can more easily be compared with specific measures from previous 
studies. 
Findings showed that prototypical graphical passcodes offer resistance to OSA. It has 
been a concern that graphical schemes would be vulnerable to OSAs because pictures may be 
clearly visible to both users and attackers. However, schemes have been successfully designed to 
resist this type of attack, making graphical schemes a viable alternative to the alphanumeric 
approach. Findings also showed that graphical passcodes were memorable. The passcodes used 
in studies 1 and 2 were system-assigned, and performance did not drop after a three-week delay 
for the graphical passcodes but did for the alphanumeric approach. These findings verify that 
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graphical passcodes offer a valuable advantage of memorability over the current widely used 
approach (Brostoff et al., 2010; Wiedenbeck et al., 2006). This advantage for memorability is 
especially important because users are needing to remember login credentials for an increasing 
number of services. 
While finding demonstrated security against OSAs and advantages for memorability, 
study 1 showed that error rates for graphical passcodes are still a potential weakness. Error rates 
were between 18 and 42%, which aligns with previous literature. Improvements in error rates 
could make graphical passcodes a more appealing alternative to the alphanumeric scheme. It is 
necessary that users of novel graphical passcodes be able to verify their identities and not be 
blocked from their primary tasks, which would lead to frustration. 
In subsequent studies investigating larger numbers of passcodes and longer passcodes, 
the researchers attempted to mitigate the discovered shortcoming of error rates by providing 
context in the form of a background scene to each passcode. By leveraging context, the 
researchers aimed to offer a solution that can be applied to any graphical passcode and make 
graphical passcodes a more feasible alternative.  
Also in these subsequent studies, the limits of memorability of graphical passcodes when 
there are a greater number of passcodes and when passcodes have a greater length were 
determined. It is essential to determine how well the advantages of recognition memory for 
pictures holds when it is considered that participants need to remember passcodes for many 
different accounts and when it is considered that longer passcodes are needed to defend against 
brute force attacks. In study 3 participants logged in with multiple graphical passcodes, and in 
study 4 participants logged in with longer graphical passcodes. In both studies, participants 
returned and logged in again three weeks later.  
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When participants logged in with multiple graphical passcodes, context appeared to 
improved memorability for eight passcodes, based on a smaller difference in error rates at time 1 
and 2 for this condition. However, the difference was due to time1 and not to time 2, suggesting 
context did not improve memorability. Context did not improve memorability when participants 
needed to remember longer graphical passcodes in study 4. It is likely that a stronger context 
intervention will need to be used if future researchers pursue this avenue.  
Findings also showed that participants perform well when remembering passcodes of 
length eight and can remember eight graphical passcodes after a three-week delay, but 
performance dropped for passcodes of length 13 and for 12 passcodes. These findings show that 
graphical schemes could potentially help with the hurdle of helping users to remember login 
credentials for many accounts and more sensitive information, and future research should 
address the challenge of improving memorability when participants need to remember more than 
eight passcodes or passcodes longer than eight pictures. 
This research benchmarked common graphical schemes, identified strengths and 
shortcomings, examined the limits of memorability, and translated basic research about context 
to the domain of graphical authentication. And, aimed to increase graphical passcodes readiness 
as an authentication option. 
TIPS FOR PRACTITIONERS 
The following tips for practitioners include general guidance that comes from previous literature 
and our findings:  
• Choose graphical schemas that use the strategy of grouping, such as CHC, to promote 
better success rates. 
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• To promote learnability, choose a graphical scheme that uses the strategy of disguising 
the passcode, such as UYI. 
• For the best learnability, choose the familiar alphanumeric scheme. 
• For faster login times, choose a graphical scheme that uses the strategy of disguising, 
such as UYI. 
• For better security against OSAs, choose a graphical scheme that uses the strategy of 
grouping, such as CHC, or translating to another location, such as WYSWYE. 
• When numerous graphical passcodes are needed for different accounts, limit the number 
of passcodes to eight. 
• When longer graphical passcodes are needed for security, limit the length to eight. 
• When users are remembering multiple graphical passcodes, context in the form of a 
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